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P R E F A C E 
The naine of liertraiid Russell has been in the fore-
front of ph i losophica l d iscuss ion for about n ine ty years. 
The breadth of his i n t e r e s t s and v a r i e t y of his 
wr i t ings have made him one of the most widely iread and 
c r i t i c a l l y discussed phi losopher . If an order i s made 
of h i s f i e l d of i n t e r e s t s , ontology would come in t h i r d 
p lace (a f te r log ic and epistemology)• Since Russell 
developed on to log ica l theor ies while deal ing with the 
epis temologica l problems, to make the th ing e a s i e r we 
have given some epis temological backdrop of his on to log ica l 
t h e o r i e s . I t i s expected t h a t such epis temological back-
drop w i l l serve as an e f f ec t ive clue to understand his 
on to log ica l theor ies p rope r ly . 
In conversat ion with the e d i t o r of The Philosophy of 
3er t rand Russe l l , Russell in t imated t h a t h i s grea t su r -
p r i s e had come from the discovery t h a t over half of the 
authors (21 authors con t r ibu ted essays in t h a t book) had 
not understood him. Taking cognizance of the above s t a t e -
ment I cannot claim with c e r t a i n t y t h a t what I have 
presented in th i s d i s s e r t a t i o n accura te ly r e f l e c t s l ^ s a e l l ' s 
viev/, ijut whenever I found divergence of opinions about 
any of the theory of i iussell among h i s comentators, I 
made e f fo r t s to choose ca re fu l ly t h a t view which most 
c lose ly r e f l e c t s Russe l l ' s own s t andpo in t . 
Here I must take the opportunity to express rny 
grati tude to my supervisor. Prof. S, waheed Akhtar, a 
ve rsa t i l e personali ty, who despite his compact schedule 
Kftve 
was kind enough to go through this d i sse r ta t ion , I^ t r ied to 
incorporate in th i s d isser ta t ion a l l of the suggestions 
made by him, 
I am also grateful to the teachers and research scholars^ 
of the philosophy department with whom I have discussed some 
of the topics, Dr, S,A, Syed (Lecturer) and Mr, Afzal 
Ahmed (research scholar) deserve special mention in this 
res pect, 
In a place away from native state, I encountered many 
difficulties. Those who helped me immensely in overcoming 
these difficulties deserve special mention. They are : 
M^, Chandrika aasak (pen-name), Mr, Pankaj Sharma, 
Mrs, Kamalesh Sharma and Mr, Vivek Sharma, 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
An on to log ica l theory always seeks to f ind i t s f( 
dat ion in a p a r t i c u l a r type of epis temological theory . One's 
conception of what the re i s o r what the re can be i s determined 
by h i s approach to the quest ion t What as a human being we 
can know. Because r e a l i t y i s always a known r e a l i t y , itie 
unknown and unknowable r e a l i t y i s in a way a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c 
t i o n . So a l l on to log ica l ques t ions u l t ima te ly can be answered 
only a f t e r thoroughly examining the ques t ions about men's 
a b i l i t y and ex t en t s to know. 
This s t r a t e g y of founding the metaphysical conjectures 
in the realm of knowledge was p a r t i c u l a r l y adopted by knowledge 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y adopted by Berfrand Russe l l . f t i i losophically« 
the beginning of the 20th century was marked by a turn away 
from metaphysical specula t ion and heralded a renewed i n t e r e s t 
in the problem of knowledge. Russel l i s among the i n i t i a t o r s 
and chief proponents of t h i s approach, out un l ike h i s o the r 
fellow phi losophers l i k e G.E. Moore and the r e a l i s t s in 
general he does not leave the on to log ica l ques t ions unanswered 
o r only vaguely or summarily answered. Although b a s i c a l l y 
an ep is temologis t he does develop a theory* oar to be more 
c o r r e c t , t h e o r i e s of be ing . Throughout h i s long phi losophical 
1 . Ilie ex is tence of unknown and unknowable r e a l i t y was 
admitted by Locke. He admitted the ex is tence of substance 
but opined t h a t substance i s unknown and unknowable. 
career he kept on changing his episternological views depending 
on which his ontological theories also a l tered in the different 
stages of h is philosophical development. 
I t i s charac ter i s t ic of Russell that he developed 
theories (not a theory) about the problem of perceptual 
taiowledge. No other philosojrfier can match him in being so 
s e l f - c r i t i c a l and so open to modify his views in the l i ^ t 
of new facts and new data. There are to his c r ed i t , broadly, 
four theories which he developed successively to explicate 
the nature and extent of human knowledge. He f i r s t advanced 
a par t icu lar theory but being d i ssa t i s f i ed with I t replaced 
i t by another theory and then in i t s turn th i s was also 
replaced by s t i l l another theory. 
I t is not possible to cover the ent i re panorama of 
Russell 's views which he advanced during a rather long period 
of about f i f ty years. In the present undertaking, an endeavour 
i s made to trace the gradual development of Russell 's views. 
In par t icular i t i s aimed a t showing how his solutions of 
ontological problems revolve on solutions of the episternolo-
gical questions. Our treatment of the subject here i s more 
expository than c r i t i c a l because Russell himself was the 
greatest c r i t i c of h is theor ies . 
I I 
A study of Russell 's philosophy should be preceded by 
a discussion of the philosophical backdrop against which the 
philosopher made his theorization. This is to say that the 
structure of Russell's theorization has a definite logical 
historical perspective with which it is inextricably linked 
both by being a part of it and also by going beyond it. 
Ihe problem of perceptual phenomena as it has presented, 
itself to Russell had a chequered history, particularly in 
Britain. It is in Britain where perceptionist doctrine 
originated and flourished throughthe writings of the philoso-
phers like Locke, Berkeley, Hume and J,S. Mill, This empirical 
tradition was temporarily overshadowed by the ideas of neo-
Hegelian thinkers in the late ninteenth and early decades 
of the twentieth century. But soon the continuity was res-
tored. For this restoration Russell contributed more than 
any other philosopher. 
Outside Britain, the American philosophical scene was 
dominated by the pragmatists and realists of various hues. 
TSiey had common among them their antagonism towards idealistic 
and absolutistic philosophies. 
When Russell was grappling with his problem, he 
continuously interacted with what may be called his philoso-
phical milieu. Ttie inner logical movement of the doctrine 
of empiricism which, historically found expression in the 
philosophical systems of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, was 
ontologically examined by Russell whose first three successive 
theories were, in essence, variants of dualism, subjectivism 
and solipsism which the three philosophers successively 
propounded. Besides, the phenomenalIstic position that 
Russell at one stage adopted was already adumbrated in the 
writings of J.S, Mill. Finally, when he came to ahdere to 
the doctrdLne of neutral monism, the influence of William 
James and some other realists on him was more than apparent. 
But while Russell allowed himself to be impressed by 
the theories mentioned above at diffeirent stages of his 
career, he was never a naive or uncritical imitator of them. 
He was endowed with a strong critical aojunen as well as an 
extraordinary power to create new ideas and arguments. Both 
originality and criticism were his strong points and they 
were given full play while making a proposition with 
regard to the problem at hand. He was liberal in accepting 
and assimilating an argument which appeared to him cogent. 
But whenever he did it, he gave a personal turn to the argu-
ment so as to make its implication reach beyond the context 
in which it was originally used. 
Russell's problem was to reconstruct a theory of 
knowledge for providing science with firm logical bases and 
foundations. He was fully conscious of the challenge posed 
by Humean scepticism. Many of his contemporaries were 
prompted by their desire to get rid of the absolutlstic 
and idealistic philosophies which they thought did not suit 
to the temper and taste of scientific man of the twentieth 
century. They were merely concerned with "refutation of 
idealism" and defense of commonsense, Russell* although, 
shares much of t h i s so -ca l l ed s c i e n t i f i c tas te with h i s 
contemporaries, i s , however, not naive enough to be content 
with accomplishing what was at best a negative task. He 
entered the domain of philosophy to find in i t some imper-
sonal and object ive truths, which re l ig ion was unable to 
give him. His search for the truth then drove him to mathe-
matics which supposedly contained universal and se l f -ev ident 
truths . At that time there were two kinds of theories which 
sought to j u s t i f y the truth of mathematical propositions i 
one of Kant's which treated mathematical judgements as 
•synthetic apriori*, and the other of Mi l l ' s according to 
which they were 'empirical general isat ions*. 
Russell was not s a t i s f i e d with e i ther of these views 
and tr ied in h is own way to provide them a philosophical 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . He sought to reduce mathematics into log ic 
so that the former may have the same kind of certainty which 
the l a t t e r possessed. He wrote a number of books including 
Principla Mathematica (in collaboration with whitehead) on 
this subject . But at a time when h i s work was Almost comp-
le ted in th i s f i e l d , Wittgenstein showed mathematical 
equations to be tautologies quite devoid of any informative 
on cognitive content. Russell found th i s theory l o g i c a l l y 
irrefutable and consequently abandoned mathematics. 
Being disappointed with mathematics, he turned to 
sc ience . But science in i t s ex i s t ing form was exposed to 
Huroean c r i t i c i s m . Two fundamental notions underlying science 
were the notions of 'induction* and 'causal i ty*. Both of them 
were shown to be l o g i c a l l y incredible by Hume. 
The nature of Humean challenge can be better real i sed 
i f we understand the paradoxical nature of the phenomena of 
perception and how our commonsensical notions about percep-
tual knowledge* when phi losophical ly analysed* resul t into 
the negation of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge. 
Commonsense regards perceptual knowledge as a simple 
presentation of objects to the perceiving mind. I t follows 
from th i s that objects perceived are public and not merely 
one's own subjective data. Public nature of the objects of 
perceptdLon means that more than one person can apprehend 
them simultaneously. We assume that knowledge through senses 
stands for a d irec t , unmediated and straight forward acquain-
tance with what there rea l ly i s . 
Philosophers challenge th i s view, itiey contend that 
a l l data presented to the senses are private to the perceiver 
and that two persons can never witness the same data, lliey 
a lso opine that in sense-perception, mind never come across 
the thing i t s e l f . Our knowledge of the external th ings , 
they say, i s always Inferent ia l , indirect and mediated. What 
i s immediately given to the senses i s ' ideas ' or 'impressions* 
or ' sense-data' , some even deny the existence of any 
material world external to and Independent of the mind. 
World, according to these philosophers# Is nothing tut a 
•construction• out of sense-data; I t Is a fancy or figment 
conjectured by the mind, never rea l ly ex i s t ing , 
Otie argument philosophers invoke to refute the common-
sense theory or naive-realism i s argument from i l lusory per-
ception* If the assumption that by means of sense-experience 
true character i s t ics of objects are revealed then, they 
contend, i l l u s i o n s , hal lucinations and other commonplace 
phenomena l ike dreams e t c . cannot be explained. 
In i l lusory perception the ir e x i s t s a discrepancy 
between the thing real and thing apparent. What i s there i s 
not perceived and what i s perceived i s not actual ly there. 
But af ter a l l something i s perceived - 'something* other than 
the object i t s e l f . Itils something i s ca l led * sense-datum' 
by the philosophers. Let us give an example t a straight 
s t i ck when dipped into transparent water appears bent. Here 
we have two appearances of the same object - one straight and 
the other bent. One of these two appearances roust be fa l se 
since one thing cannot be s traight and crooked at the same 
time. Ttie way to explain th i s s i tuat ion i s to say that when 
we saw the s t i c k , we actual ly did not see the thing I t s e l f 
but something other than i t . This something other i s ca l led 
'sense-datum *• 
Philosophers who uphold the theory of sense data 
apply i t not only to the cases where there are two contradictory 
appearances o£ the same object , but to nonnal cases of 
perception too . They contend that in a l l cases of perception, 
whether ver id ica l or non-veridical^we come across sense-data 
and for th i s reason knowledge of the real object ( i f there i s 
one) i s always inferred and ind irec t . 
From above, i t becomes c lear that the moment the pheno-
mena of i l lu s ions* hal lucinations e tc together with other 
physical and psychological considerations are taken care of, 
the n a i v e - r e a l i s t i c assumptions about the knowledge of the 
external world become ent i re ly implausible. Ihe theory that 
results out of these considerations is known as 'epistemolo-
g ical dualism*# which stands for a duality between the objects 
d irec t ly known and those known only ind irec t ly . 
This dua l i s t i c theory of knowledge faces a twofold 
d i f f i c u l t y . F i r s t , i f sense-data mediate between the mind 
and material body, then what i s the nature of relationship 
between the former and the l a t t e r , secondly, i f our whole 
knowledge i s confined to the sense-data which obviously 
pertains to the mind, then what Jus t i f i ca t ion do we have for 
our bel ief in the existence of material objects outside mind ? 
In order to solve these d i f f i c u l t i e s many philosophers 
rejected the bel ie f in objec t iv i ty and independence of 
things and confined knowledge simply to the sense-data which 
i s the possession of mind. But again i f the sense-data are 
exclus ive ly our own private possess ions , never object ive 
M 
and public , the question remains wherefrom do these data 
come to our mind ? Tlie paradoxical nature of the probl«n 
of perception becomes apparent. A host of theories have been 
forged to solve these problems. 
From the above discussion i t becomes c lear that the 
be l ie f in an external world consist ing of substantial material 
objects i s l o g i c a l l y incredible . Our mind i s presented with 
b i t s of experiences and t h i s i s a l l that we may claim to know 
to e x i s t . But what about the mind i t s e l f which i s supposed to 
be aware of sense.data 7 DO we perceive i t as something 
substantial which inheres dif ferent data ? Obviously not . 
Itie bel ie f in mind as permanent and pers i s t ing substance i s 
as incredible as i s the bel ie f in substantial physical things . 
Both are equally unperceived and therefore non~existent. 
In this way after elimination of mind and matter* we 
are l e f t only with momentary data which occur to us in 
successive moments. At one moment only one dataum occurs. 
Any be l ie f in the dataum of preceding moment or that of the 
moment to come would underly the assumption of a pers is t ing 
mind which has been shown untenable. Ihus our whole cosmos« 
at a given moment* i s confined only, to the dataxim that occurs 
to us at a particular moment and nothing beyond. Such s o l i -
p s i s t i c conclusion was drawn by Hume. 
British empiricists s tarted with the part ia l reduction 
of physical things into the ir experiences and moved to making 
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the reduction complete by denying the very possibility of any 
genuine experience, Locke defined the knowledge of physical 
things in terms of 'ideas' of what he called the primary and 
secondary qualities of a thing. Primary qualities# according 
to him* belonged to things while secondary qualities were 
merely the powers to produce various sensations In us by 
primary qualities. The primary qualities were primary and real 
because bodies retained them in any circumstances and without 
them the very conception of bodies would be impossible, 
Ihen came Berkeley, He declared that secondary qualities 
as well as primary qualities are dependent upon the mind. So 
they have the same status. Distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities was denied, Berkeley's famous dictum 
esse est percipi stands for the reduction of existence of 
things into their experiences and to make the two terms 
synonymous. 
But the trouble does not end here. Our assertion about 
our own mind as subsisting the ideas we receive from outside 
can well be called in question. For, we never come across it. 
It is never presented to us as the sensibles are« and if so« 
the whole possibility of knowledge vanishes. Our beliefs in 
the existence of God, worldly things and even of our own 
minds is illegitimate, we are compelled to plunge into 
complete scepticism and solipsism, Hiis position was taken 
by Hume, He carried the empiricism to its logical conclusion. 
He» as Russell said« "•••• banished the conception of subs-
tance (from psychology) as Berkeley had banished it from 
physics*. Hume first made us cut off from the external uni-
verse and get trapped into our own mental world and then 
removed even the latter possibility^ thereby leaving us into 
complete darkness. 
Let us see some of the consequences of such decision. 
If the logical conslusion of empiricism was scepticism about 
the physical as well as psychological world, science is also 
cut off from its roots. Scientific method explains the 
occurrence of an event in terms of the preceding event of 
which it is supposed to be an effect. Ihis underlies the 
assumption that a cause-event is linked with its effect-event 
in the relation of necessary entailment. But Hume denied 
any such linking. T^\e feeling of pain and the experience of 
putting the finger into fire that causes it are two altogether 
different and independent events and no logical connection 
can be sought between the two« opined Hume. It is true that, 
as we recollect, the experience of finger burnt is always 
in the past followed by pain. But the recollection itself is 
inferred and, therefore, of precarious nature, secondly, 
from the fact that two events have been associated in the 
past, it does not logically follow that in future also they 
will be similarly associated. 
Science, in fact bases itself upon the inductive method 
in which one generalises a conclusion which is drawn from a 
i : 
l imited s e t of observed phenomena. I t i s , therefore, l o g i c a l l y 
undefensible. 
The denial of causal i ty and induction thus not only 
shook the foundation of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge but of knowledge 
as such. At th i s juncture a philosophy which could reconstruct 
the bases of knowledge became the need of the hour. The 
philosopher who attempted t h i s task was Kant. Kant himself 
admitted that he was awakened from h i s do^natic slximber by 
Hume. 
Kant's reconstruction consisted in synthesising rationalism 
with empiricism and developing a unique metaphysics. He con-
curred with the empiricists* contention that what we can 
]cnow of things are merely the ir apparent forms, the ir real 
nature remains hidden behind these appearances. But the 
appratus throuc^ which we perceive them are such that the 
order in which things are arranged are genuinely revealed 
to u s . Ttiis apparatus comprises space, time, and different 
l og ica l categories such as quantity, qual i ty , re lat ion , e t c . 
All our knowledge i s determinedby our subjective const i tut ion . 
I t i s for th i s reason we can be sure that a l l of our experi-
ences are universal ly true. 
Apart frcnn t h i s , we a l l be l ieve that there are certain 
moral laws which are universal ly true and v a l i d , e . g . , 
(Stealing i s bad*, 'speaking truth i s good*, e t c . Now the 
presence of these moral laws demands Just ice which means 
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that a person should be rewarded or punished proportionate 
to his virtue or vice. Justice, in most of the cases« is not 
i 
affected In this life. So presupposition of another incar-
nation after present incarnation becomes necessary. In addition 
to this* ood must have also endowed man with freedom of will 
since without this there would be no question of reward and 
punishment. God, freedom of will and life after death are, 
therefore, basic postulates that are needed for explaining 
moral phenomena. 
iSie two arguments Illustrated above have been based by 
Kant on'pure reason' and 'practical reason* respectively. 
Russell remarked that pure reason was reason and practical 
reason was prejudice. The latter was implausible on its face 
value and the former was found bristled with some insur-
mountable difficulties. For example, if it is asked what 
makes a perceiver see things precisely in that particular 
order in which he sees it and not otherwise. Why, for 
instance, do we always find people's eyes above their nose 
and not below them. Kant views that eyes and nose cause 
separate percepts in us but the order in which they are 
perceived belongs not to them as they are in themselves, 
but to our own subjective perceptions of them. Science, on 
the other hand, tells that our different percepts, in their 
arrangement, must reflect and represent the arrangement out 
there is the world between things of which they are percepts. 
Two colour percepts, e.g., must correspond to two different 
H 
wavelengths. If Kant i s r l c^t , a l l the spat ia l and temporal 
re lat ions in our percepts must be arbitrary, not re f l ec t ing 
the real order in the cosmos. 
In brief , Kant's reconstructive philosoj^y, although 
profound and sublime could not be treated as adequately s a t i s -
factory. 
I l l 
The cr i t ic i sm of Berkeley and Hume rendered Lock's 
dualism l o g i c a l l y implausible. But the log ica l conclusion 
drawn by Hume could hardly s a t i s f y the philosophers of the 
twentieth century who had a robust fa i th in science and 
commonsense. So we see in the f i r s t quarter of the twentieth 
century several philosophers grouped themselves under a 
common umbrella and tr i ed hard to j u s t i f y commonsense world 
view. 
In around 1912 some American philosophers formed a group 
with the object ive to dispel the influence of Neo-Hegelian 
philosophy. Tliey produced a jo in t work e n t i t l e d New Realism 
in which they t r i ed to j u s t i f y the commonsense assumptions 
about the knowledge of the world by reject ing the dua l i s t i c 
and i d e a l i s t i c theor ies . 
The new r e a l i s t s were followed by another group of 
philosophers who accused the ir predecessors for being 
uncr i t i ca l and naive in the ir approach. Diey developed a 
1 
a nev system which. I t i s claimed* i s more consistent and 
safe because i t eliminated the incoherencies of naive 
realism. They ca l l ed themselves c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t s . The view-
point of c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t s was d u a l i s t i c , i . e . , they believed 
in mediated and indirect knowledge of the external world. 
The main task before thernew-realist was to reject 
dualism and subjective idealism and to affirm commonsense. 
The c r i t i c a l rea l i s t s aimed at c r i t i c i s i n g the new-real ists 
, and subjec t iv i s t s while 
es tabl i shing the epistemological dualism, itius* they Joint ly 
opposed idealisrabut, a t the same time opposed each other 
in the ir respective standpoints. 
« 
In order to prove the ir contention about independent 
existence of material things they simply invoked man.'s 
i n s t i n c t i v e be l ie f in the external i ty of things . Crit ical 
r e a l i s t s admitted i l lu s ions and they confined direct knowledge 
to the appearances. 
The twentieth century American t h o u ^ t found an echo in 
the contemporaneous British philosophy, several thinkers 
emerged in order to combat the i d e a l i s t i c philosophies of their 
predecessors. G.E. Moore championed the cause of conmonsense. 
He thous^t he could prove the existence of external world 
simply by holding out his hands. In a perceptual experience, 
he opined* what we d irect ly come across i s the upper surface of 
the thing, the sense-datum, which i s related to i t . a i t in 
regard to the question in what manner the two were related, 
Moore was unclear and baffled. 
16 
Apart from Bertrand Russell, whose philosophy we shall 
discuss In the next chapters, A.J. Ayer also accepted the theory 
of sense-data giving his own colour to It, But Ayer refused to 
acknowledge the sense-dataum as a natural entity as Moore. 
Russell and others did. According to him, using the term 
'sense-dataum* Is merely a matter o£ linguistic expediency. 
From the foregoing discussion It appears that though 
the twentieth century philosophers %«ere grappling with the 
Humean challange they were not aware of their problem In all 
Its depth and complexity* Their primary mission was to dispel 
and dismantle the Influence of Idealistic philosophy which 
they thought to be outmoded and outdated. If the new-reallst0 
opposed the representative theory besides Idealism, It was due 
to their fear that the former would lead to the latter. Like-
wise, if the critical realists opposed new^realism it was 
because they realised that a support of commonsense assumptions 
which is doomed to be a failure, may render their own defence 
of ireallsm doubtful, of course, it must be admitted that these 
thlnloers were by and large successful in accomplishing at least 
one task, i.e., refutation of idealism. But the real task of 
reconstructing knowledge by providing it with a new foundation 
was not touched upon by them. 
Russell's uniqueness among his contemporaries lies in 
the fact that he was not only fully aware of the graveness 
of the problem but also tried to resolve it by employing all 
his abilities. How seriously he took this problem can be 
r 
imagined £rom the fact that for about half a century he 
remained Incessantly concertied with this problem and developed 
one after another theory to give a satisfactory solution of 
the problem. He developed one theory but finding that it was 
not flawless and satisfactory replaced It by another which 
Itself was In turn replaced by a more satisfactory one. 
In Russell's philosophy, particularly during the period 
when he was engaged with the above-mentioned problem, we find 
at least four distinctive stages. In his first stage he was 
a candid dualist. He contended that knowledge arises due to 
confrontation between mind and matter through sense-data. 
His problems of Philosophy (published in 1912) represents his 
ideas at this stage. His second stage is termed 'phenomenalism* 
Here he explains perception in terms of the mind's encounter 
with what he calls 'sensibilia* which do not represent but 
constitute the physical object. This position is discussed in 
his Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). His philosophy 
of the third stage is represented in his Analysis of Mind in 
which he, under the influence of James' doctrine of neutral 
monism, propounds a non-relational theory of perception. 
Finally, in.Analysis of Matter and subsequent works, he again 
altered his views radically and reverted to his original 
duallstlc and causalistlc position although in a more reflnd 
and sophisticated form. 
It is correct that Russell changed his views one after 
another. But there were certain ideas to which Russell clung 
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t i l l the l a s t moment of his philosophical career. For Instance, 
he was never a na ive -rea l i s t or an i d e a l i s t . About naive-
realism he said that only a l i t t l e amount of c r i t i c a l ref lect ion 
together with considerations from science i s needed to show i t 
implausible. Sc i en t i f i c considerations are perhaps more hazar-
dous, although science s tar t s i t s e l f with na ive -rea l i s t i c 
assumptions* 
About idealism Russel l 's opinion t i l l 1914 was that i t 
was a product of faulty reasoning. Berkeley committed a fa l lacy 
when he ident i f ied the act of sensation with the object . 
Berkeley argued that since an object i s known to e x i s t only 
by v irtue of i t s being experienced by the mind, therefore, i t 
must be mental. Russel l , on the other hand, said mind's 
experiencing of the object i s mental, because i t i s an object 
that we come to know. I t i s by i t s nature external to us and 
therefore a projjer subject-matter of physics. Indeed, his 
preference for the noroenclatuire of 'sense-data* had behind i t 
the purpose of giving s tress to the 'given* and 'presented' 
character of the object . 
T i l l 1914 Russell considered mind an indesjjensible thing 
in explaining the phenomena of perceptual knowledge. But when 
he |f#placed dualism by neutral monisliic theory of knowledge, 
the notion of mind as substance, l ike that of matter, appeared 
to him redundant. I t was rep>laced by log ica l construction out 
of di f ferent b i t s of sensat ions. 
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Like naive-realIsm and Idealism, Russell entertained 
a peculiar opdnlon about solipsism. On the one hand he regarded 
It to be logically Irrefutable, on the other he thought this 
doctrine as practically barren and therefore Inadmissible, 
Empiricist analysis of knowledge due to and through Its ovm 
Inner logical dynamics, leads to solipsism, Vte try to base 
our belief In physical and mental worlds on experience, but 
both are experientially elusive* Even two sensations of succe-
ssive moments can not be affirmed In their Interrelated foinn, 
for this relation too Is not experienced. Thus our whole know-
ledge at a moment Is logically confined to the sensation that 
Is occurlng to me at that moment. But Russell was a thinker 
who had faith In science and solipsism was undermining Its 
root. He tried hard to protect science from the onslaughts 
of solipsism. He always sought for the grounds which can enable 
him to dispense with solipsism. But It was admittedly unass-
ailable logically. This Impelled Russell to make a compromise. 
An Important characteristic of Russell's philosophy is 
that although it is in the tradition of British empirical 
philosophy, his method is quite different. The method of 
previous philosophers was largely psychological Introspective 
whereas Russell's method Is logical analytical. 
IV 
In t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l g ive a b r i e f account of R u s s e l l ' s 
personal l i f e . Russe l l l o s t h i s mother when he was two years 
o ld and fa ther when he was t h r e e . He was brought up In the 
house of his grandfather. Lord John Russell. He adnd.tted that 
though he was told almost nothing by his father he had gone 
through exactly the same mental and emotional development as 
his father had. 
Russell's childhood and adolescence were unhappy. The 
atmosphere of his grandmother's (grandfather died shortly) 
house was one of puritan piety and austerity, and his lonli-
ness, he said, was almost unbearable. In adolescence, he 
remarked, he was continually on the verge of suicide, from 
which, however, he was restrained by the desire to know more 
mathematics. 
Russell was a voracious reader. He used to read in his 
grandfather's library, which became his classroom. At the age 
of eleven he began to read Euclid, which was still a prescribed 
text book of geometry. He was surprised to see that Euclid 
began with axioms, which had to be accepted without proof. 
It created great curiosity in him. Russell writes ; 
"Throughout the rest of my boyhood, mathematics 
absorbed a very large part of my interest. This 
interest was complex t partly mere pleasure in 
discovering that I possessed a certain kind of 
skill, partly delight in the power of deductive 
reasoning, partly the restfullness of mathemati-
cal certainty; but more than any of these... the 
belief that nature operates according to mathe-
matical laws, and that human actions, like 
planetary notions, could be calculated 1£ we had 
sufficient skill. By the time I was fifteen, I 
had arrived at a theory very similar to that of 
the cartesians, fhe movement of living bodies, 
I felt convinced, were wholly regulated by the 
laws of dynamics, therefore free will must be 
an illusion* But, since I accepted consciousness 
as an indubitable datum, I could not accept 
materialism, though I had a certain hankering 
after it... "• 
At fourteen or fifteen he became passionately interested 
in religion, and set to work to examine successively the argu-
ments of free will, immortality, and God, For a few months 
he had an agnostic tutor with whom he could talk about these 
problems. But soon he lost his faith in religion. He discarded 
first free will, then litinortality and then God, He was very 
much influenced by Mill, Russell himself admitted that Mill's 
Political Economy, Liberty and Subjection of women Influenced 
him profoundly, 
Russell's life in Cambridge opened to him a new world 
of infinite delight. For the first time in Cambridge he found 
that when he uttered his thoughts, they seemed to be accepted 
as »#orth considering. Many stalwarts of philosophy became his 
friends, whitehead, McTaggart, G,E. Moore, Henry Sldgwick, 
James Ward, G.F. Stout are some of them. He fell under the 
spell of Hegel through Bradly to whose absolute Idealism he 
subscribed but very soon he discarded it. 
1. Bertrand Russell, "My Mental Development", The Philosophy 
of Bertand Russell, ed, by Paul Arthur Schllpp, The Lilarary 
of Living Philosophers, Evaston, Illions (1946), p, 7, 
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After leaving Canibridge in 1984, he spent a good deal 
of time in foreign countries* For some time he held the post of 
diplomat. But he had no desire for a diplomatic career and gave 
up this post in 1894, In 1895 he got married and spent most 
of that year in Berlin (Germany). Their he studied economics 
and German Social Democracy, After this travel he settled down 
in Sussex and devoted his time to philosophy and mathematics. 
In the years from 1894 to 1898, he believed in the 
possibility of proving by metaphysics various things about the 
universe that religious feeling made him think Important. He 
decided to devote all his life to philosophy. During 1898 
various things caused him to abandon both Kant and Hegel. 
The most important in Russell's Intellectual life was 
the year 1900. In that year he visited the International Congress 
of Philosophy in Paris. We have mentioned earlier that ever 
since he had begun Euclid at the age of elevan, he had been 
troubled about the foundations of mathematics. When he came 
to read philosophy, he found Kant and empiricists equally 
unsatisfactoiry. He neither liked synthetic a priori nor 
empirical generalizations. In Paris Philosop*iy Congress he 
was impressed by the fact that, in all discussions, Peano 
and his pupils had a precision which was not possessed by 
others. He soon mastered Peano's notation and saw that it 
extended the region of mathematical precision backwards towards 
regions which had been given over to philosophical vagueness. 
Basing himself on Peano's notation. Russell Invented a notation 
for relations. Whitehead also agreed as to the importance of 
the method and in a very short time they worked out together 
such matters as the definitions of series. Cardinals* and 
oridinals* and the reduction of arithmetic to logic. They 
worked out together what has been titled •Prlncipla Mathematica*• 
After completion of Principia in 1910 he stepped to 
epistemological and ontoXogical fields which we shall discuss 
in the following chapters. 
At the end of this introduction we give a list of some 
of the books written by Russell : 
!• Problems of Philosophy 
2* Principia Mathematica 
3. Introduction to Mathematical Philosoj^iy 
4. Our Knowledge of the External World 
5. Analysis of Mind 
6« Analysis of Matter 
7. An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth 
8* Human Knowledge - Its Scope and Limits 
9« Logic and Knowledge 
10. Mysticism and Logic 
11. My Philosophical Development 
12. History of Western Philosophy 
13. An Outline of Philosophy 
14. The Principles of Mathematics 
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15. PortrAlta from Memory 
16. Philosophy of LelbQiz 
17. Sceptical Essay 
18. The ABC of Relativity 
19. Human Society in Ethics and Politics 
20. The Impact of Science in Society. 
21. New hopes for a changing World, 
22. Authority and the Individual. 
23. Why I am not a Christian 
24. Unpopular Essays 
25. Power 
26. In Praise of Idleness 
27. The Conquest of Happiness 
28. The Scientific Outlook 
29. Marriage and Morals 
30. Education and the Social order 
31. On Education 
***** 
chapter - 1 
JOURNEY TOWARDS NEUTRAL MONISM X EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
Russell began his philosophical career as an Absolute 
Idealist, so far as ontological analysis is concerned. That 
ls» he maintained that the fundamental stuff of reality Mas the 
Absolute Mind. Ho\*ever, in 1898, G.E. Moore convinced him of 
the Inadequacy of his position. The arguments used by Moore, 
and accepted by Russell, against Absolute Idealism, in the 
article "Refutation of Idealism" brought about a revolutionary 
change in the philosophical world. 
Before 1903 Russell read Leibniz and Came to the conclu-
sion that many of the Leibniz's opinions were due to purely 
logical doctrine that every proposition has a subject and a 
predicate. Leibuiz shares this doctrine with Spinoza, Hegel 
and Bradley, Russell saw that if this doctrine is rejected, 
the entire edifice for the metaphysics of all these philosophers 
is shattered, in his Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell endeavoured 
to show that monadology was a deduction from certain premises, 
mainly logical, which Leibniz tacitly accepted as self-evident. 
Before we take up the arguments advanced by Russell for 
refutation of Absolute Idealism, let us first discuss what 
impelled Russell to refute that theory. 
1. G.E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism", Mind, (1903), 
pp, 433-54. 
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Russell's motivation In the rejection of Absolute Idealism 
was his desire to establish the Irreduclblllty of relations 
and a Platonic theory of propositions, which would render them 
Independent of mental activity, without these, mathematical 
philosophy is rendered self-contradictory. So with these doc-
trines he desired to establish the foundations of mathematics. 
Writes Russell in his "Logical Atomism" : "I came to philosophy 
through mathematics or rather through the wish to find some 
reason to believe in the truth of mathematics", ihus while 
Russell was working on the foundation of mathematics* he 
accepted dualism to get an adequate basis for the non-self-
contradlctory character of mathematics. 
Russell's objection to Idealism of monistic type 
(represented by Hegel) and monadic type (advocated by Leibniz) 
is logical, whereas his refutation of Berkeley's Idealism 
rests on empirical grounds. Absolute Idealists assume, Russell 
views, as its basic principle the doctrine of internal rela-
tions, i.e., the view that "every relation is grounded in 
the natures of the related terms". Absolute Idealism regards 
the above axiom as equivalent to the assumptions that every 
relation is really an adjective of the terms taken as a whole 
and that every proposition has one subject and one predicate. 
From this view, Russell argues, it follows that there is only 
one final and complete truth which consists of one proposition 
with one subject (the Whole) and one predicate. 
Russell raised several objections to the axiom given 
by Absolute Idealists. First, it cannot be carried out, 
especially in the case of asyimnetrical relations. If we try 
to reduce a relation like 'greater then* to adjectives of the 
related terms, considered as a whole, we cannot then distin-
guish the relation from its converse. Consequently, we cannot 
give any sense or direction to the relation. Secondly, it 
is absurd on its own grounds. Its fundamental proposition, 
"There is only one subject and its predicate" is false because 
it implies a distinction between the predicate and the subject. 
This demands the assertion of absolute identity in reality, 
which is incompatible with the idealist thesis of identity 
in difference. 
Russell's criticism of monadology is mainly directed 
against Leibniz treatment of relations, Leibniz attempted to 
reduce relations to predicates of individual substances. 
Russell objected this view on two grounds s First, it cannot 
convey the sense of an asymmetrical relation either, and 
second, it is not compatible with Leibniz* belief in a plu-
rality of spirits, which is the essence of idealism. Russell 
contends that to maintain any form of pluralism the ultimacy 
of relations must be insisted on, 
Russell's refutation of Berkeley is derived from 
Moore's distinction between consciousness and the object of 
consciousness. Russell contends that Berkeley's argument is 
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based upon the fa l lacy of equivocation, Berkeley uses 'Idea* 
in two di f ferent senses i (1) as the object of sensation and 
( i i ) as the sensation i t s e l f . In his Problems of Philosophy, 
Russell writes that Berkeley's theory that the object roust be 
mental seems to depend for i t s p laus ib i l i ty upon confusing 
the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension* 
Russel l ' s refutation of Berkeley brings us to his 
dualism of the mental and the physical world. He maintains 
that every presentation and every be l i e f must have an object 
other than i t s e l f and, except in certain cases where mental 
ex i s tents happen to be concerned* the object i s extramental. 
Mind and matter are the ultimate e n t i t i e s of the world of 
existence so far as ontological analysis i s concerned. 
Russel l 's argument for matter i s based upon sense-data and 
certain principles of inference. The argument for mind i s based 
upon immediate experience. 
In the preceding paragraph we have mentioned Russel l 's 
contention that every presentation and every be l ie f must have 
an object , i » e , , i t has an extramental denotation. In th i s 
contention Meinong's influence on Russell i s evident. Let 
us discuss th i s at same length, 
Meinong had held the view that every term or phrase 
which can be subject of a l o g i c a l l y meaningful proposition 
has always i t s extraverbal counterpart in the physical world. 
This physical counterpart const i tutes i t s meaning. In order 
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to prop up his theory Meinong admitted that many strange 
entitles like golden-mountain, round scfuare, unicorn must 
subsist since they can be used meaningfully as subjects In 
logical propositions. 
Russell found that this theory has certain insurmountable 
difficulties. One such difficulty is with regard to George IV*s 
statement ia which he wished to know whether Scott was the 
author of Waverley, The point is that if Meinongian theory is 
true, the terra 'Scott* and the expression 'author of Waverley' 
must be substitutible to each other, since they refer to the 
same entity, viz., the person Scott. But if the expression 
•author of Waverley' is replaced with Scott then what George 
IV wished to know becomes whether Scott was Scott which is 
absurd. 
Another difficulty is that if the law of excluded 
middle holds then one of the two statements 'Present King of 
France is bald' and its negation 'Present King of France 
is not bald' must be tirue. But if we enumerate all the things 
that are blad and then that are not bald, we will not find 
in either of the lists any such thing as 'the present king 
of Prance*. Again two statements, e.g., "The tallest 
building of America exists* aiuJ "The golden-mountain exist' , 
are of the same logical form, but whereas the former is quite 
meaningful the same cannot be said about the latter. The 
latter also cannot be said to be meaningless for its opposite 
.IP 
'The golden mountain does not exist* Is true and makes 
perfect sense• 
In the above Instances* difficulty arises because, says 
Russell• we take what Is a descriptive phrase as refferlng 
to a definite object which Is really not the case. Russell's 
solution of these difficulties In his theory of description 
consisted In the elimination of the descriptive phrases by 
analysing the propositions In which they occur. His convln-
ctlon Is that denoting phrases — the so-and-so • a so-andrso 
have no meaning In Isolation* Their meanlngfulness Is deter-
mined by the sentences of which they are constituents. Thus, 
•If I say', writes Russell* 'Scott was a man* that Is a 
statement of the form 'It was a man' and it has Scot for its 
subject. But if I say 'The author of Waverly was a man* that 
is not a statement of the form 'It was a man*. 
To ascertain whether a given proposition containing a 
descriptive phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' is meaningful 
or not we are requlired to make a analysis of that proposition. 
The analysis would be such that the sum total of the analysis 
must be equivalent with the proposition being analysed. 
Thus falling back upon analysis Russell gave a solution 
to the problem. Complex propositions are analysed into simpler 
propositions and then into still simpler propositions. This 
1. Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, Eassays 1901-1950, 
ed. by Robert Charles Marsh, London : George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. 1956, p, 51. 
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process continues upto the stage where the propositions at 
hand are further unanalysible. These unanalysable propositions, 
Russell termed, atomic propositions and have for their subjects 
and predicates what Russell called 'simples'. 
It is clear from the theory of description that accordina 
to Russell the descriptive phrase does not name any object, 
they rather denote the object. That is they stand for the 
objects with which we have only Indirect acquaintance. The 
word 'Scott* stands for an object which we can directly see 
or touch. But the expression 'the present king of Prance' 
denotes object (existent or non-existent) which Ue do not 
directly perceive. Such kind of expressions simply describe 
the objects they stand for. 
When Russell was trying hard to provide a satisfactory 
solution to the Meinonglan ontological theory he still upheld 
the dualism between the subject and the object. He maintained 
that a logically proper name always stands for a purely 
existent object i.e. 'simple' or 'individual*. But he held 
that we do not know the Independently existent objects direc-
tly, but through 'sense-data'. 
The nature of sense-data is of great importance in 
philosophy. A wrong analysis of it led many philosophers 
in the past astray and is still a source of many confusions. 
In the history of philosophy, it was Locke who held that the 
qualities (called by him 'secondary qualities') like colours. 
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tastes and smells as opposed to the primary qualities like shape, 
texture etc. do not exist In the physical things, but these 
are sensations produced by the primary qualities. That ts, 
according to Locke, secondary qualities are subjective. Berkeley 
went a further step ahead and declared that all sensible quali-
ties are subjective. He gave the same status to both primary 
and secondary qualities. But the difficulty before him and his 
successors was how to establish an objective world existing 
independently of our minds. Since, otherwise, all things 
unexperienced would have to be called non-existent which is 
contrary to commonsense. It is absurd to say that when we shut 
our eyes, the table before me cease to exist (since it is not 
experienced by me). 
Russell takes sense-data to be subjective, but not in 
the psychological sense as Berkeley and others did. He takes 
it rather in a physiological sense and thereby makes it 
objectively accessible for physics. The fallacy, according to 
him, in Idealists reasoning is that they fail to distinguish 
the awareness from the data it is awareness of and argue that 
since the awareness is mental its data must also be mental. 
Russell, on the other hand, emphasises the relational nature 
of our knowledge. The moment we say we are conscious of sense-
data, we are already out of the circumference of subjectivity. 
So Russell concludes that sense-data are really outside the 
purview of psychology and can be subject matter only of 
physics or physiology. Since it is only awareness which is 
a 
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related to the mind. I t I s plain that In any case of 
particular experience, i f mind ceases to e x i s t , i t i s only 
awareness that %fould vanish, the sense-data would remain there. 
I t i s interest ing to note that there i s a s tr ik ing 
s imi lar i ty between the viei*s of Russell and Locke. Both of 
them admitted that through sense-data we come to know the 
things. The knowledge of sense-data i s ca l led by Russell 
•knowledge by acquaintance*. The difference between them i s 
only that for Locke apart from sense-data the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f 
does not become the object of our knowledge. He termed i t 
unknown and unknowable. But Russell opines that through des-
cription things-in-themselves become the object of our knowledge 
this knowledge i s derived from and dependent upon sense-data. 
From the preceding paragraph i t becomes c lear that Russell 
gives the knowledge obtained through acc[uaintance a founda-
t ional s tatus upon which the whole structure o£ human knowledge 
i s b u i l t . But the question ar i ses — what are the objects of 
acquaintance ? Are sensible qua l i t i e s the only objects which 
we know through acquaintance ? 
There must be th ings , contends Russel l , besides sense-data 
which are equally tangible and certa in . The f i r s t extension 
that he proposes to make i s 'acquaintance by memory'. In any 
case of remembering, the object being recal led i s such that 
i t i s d i r e c t l y presented to my mind, although i t i s a past 
event. Such unmediated knowledge through memory, according to 
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Russe l l , t he source of a l l our knowledge concerning the 
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pa s t . 
In problems o£ Philosophy, Russell says t h a t ' s e l f -
consciousness* i s the sourx:e of a l l our knowledge of mentol 
t h ings . So he i s broadeniiig the sphere of knowledge. But the 
knowledge by se l f -consc iousness i s not about the se l f devoid 
of i t s con ten t . Whenever we r e f l e c t i n t r o s p e c t i v e l y in ou r se lves , 
i t i s not the bare ' s e l f which we come ac ros s ; i t i s r a t h e r 
thoughts and fee l ings which are the data of our exper ience . 
The quest ion whether we ever come across our bare selves I s 
one t h a t Russell i s h e s i t a n t t o give any ca t ego r i ca l answer. 
On the one hand, i t appears t h a t Aince our acquaintance i s only 
with p a r t i c u l a r b i t s of ideas and sensa t ions the se l f which 
i s supposed to inhere them i s as beyond our d i r e c t access as 
are the physical subs tances . But, on the o the r hand, there are 
c e r t a i n cons idera t ions which impel us to be l i eve t h a t we are 
a l so acquainted with our selveis. In the f i r s t p l ace , i t i s 
seen tha t in a p a r t i c u l a r case of i n t r o s p e c t i v e awareness, two 
elements a re obtensively involved, v i z , the perceiving subjec t 
and the object being perceived. They stand In same kind of 
r e l a t i o n t o one another in which we are r e l a t e d to them. For 
example, when I am aware of my perceiving the t a b l e , the 
sense-datum which represen t s the t ab l e and the se l f to which 
t h i s sense-dataum i s r ep resen ted , are both contents of my 
2. Bertrand Russe l l , Problems of Philosophy, London, Williams 
and Norgate (1912), p . 76. 
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knowledge. Thus, we can say that the whole fact I am aware 
of Is •self-acquainted with sense-datum'• 
Again, when I know that the proposition 'I am acquainted 
with the sense-datum' is true, I must be aware of the 'I* 
along with the datum. Here Russell faces a very difficult 
situation. He writes in his Problems of Philosophy, "Thus in 
some sense it would seem we must be acquainted with ourselves 
as opposed to our particular experiences. But the question is 
difficult and complicated arguments can be adduced on either 
side. Hence although acquaintance with our selves seems 
probably to occur, it is not wise to assert that it undoubtedly 
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does occur". 
In his analysis of experience, Russell gives fundamental 
Importance to the knowledge obtained through acquaintance 
which consists of a simple and unanalysable relationship 
between the subject and its object. Objects of acquaintance 
are not necessarily those presented to outer senses; they 
Include the objects which we cognise through memory and intro-
spection. Universals are as well data of acquaintance as are 
the particulars. Self can also be possibly added to the list. 
3. Ibid, p. 80. 
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What has been discussed so far i s predominantly the 
view presented in Problems of Philosophy* We have seen that 
in this book Russell has accepted Moore's d is t inct ion 
between the mental act of being aware and the sense-object 
of which we are aware. The former he cal led sensation and 
the l a t t e r sense-dataum. He hes is tant ly here admits the 
existence of se l f . He is inclined to think that i t could be 
known by observation, in the form of introspection, Russell, 
however, admits that there are arguments on the other s ide , 
and therefore wi l l not say that acquaintance with ourselves 
undoubtedly occurs. In the face of th i s dilemma he concluded 
tha t i t s occurrence seems probable. 
Why Russell is so much hesi tant to admit the self 
readily ? What is that thing which puzzled him ? To get a 
proper answer to these question i t wil l be bet ter to get a 
cursory look of his predecessors*, par t icu lar ly empicis i ts ' 
view on this , 
I t was assumed by both Locke and Berkeley that a man's 
• s e l f is an immaterial substance. Locke expl ic i t ly claimed 
tha t he had an in tu i t ive knowledge of his own existence, 
meaning by this the existence of his se l f . Here Hume shows 
himself to be more consistent empir ic is t . He raised the 
question from what impression th i s idea of self can be 
derived. His answer i s that there i s no such impression. 
He further says that all our particular perceptions are 
different and distinguishable and separable from each other. 
They all may exist separately and have no need of anything 
to support their existence. He writes in his Treatise ; "For 
my part when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself# I always stumble on some particular perception on 
other, of heat or cold or light or shade, pain or pleasure. 
I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
can never observe anything hut the perception". He conclu-
ded that there is nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeeds each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement. 
But it is not enough merely to say that the self is 
a 'bundle of perceptions•, The point is how such a bundle 
holds together. In other words, how a series of perceptions 
must be related for them to constitute a single self. And 
at this point Hume, in the appendix of the Treatise, 
confesses himself to be at a loss. 
The question was taken up again by Mill, whose views 
on the nature of the mind largely concurs with Hume's. Me 
improves on Hume by bringing in possible perceptions or 
feelings, and he makes an attempt to deal with the per-
plexing problem of our knowledge of other minds. But when 
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he comes to the question of accounting for self-consciousness 
upon his principles he weakly resigns himself to talking of 
a ' f ina l ly inexplicable f a c t ' . 
I t has been pointed out in the introduction that 
Russell was mainly responsible for the revival of British 
empir ic is t ic t r a d i t i o n . But he rejected subjective idealism 
of Berkeley. At the same time he could not accept Hume's 
view wholeheartedly. He saw c lear ly the s o l i p s i s t i c conse-
quence of Hume's View^ and was not ready to give up robust 
fa i th in commonsense. That is why he has been osc i l l a t ing in 
admitting the ' s e l f in Problems of Philosophy. Perhaps a t 
this juncture he got a clue to solve th is vexed problem in 
the maxim of Occam's fazor. This maxim stands for the reduc-
t ion of inferred en t i t i e s and the i r replacement by logical 
constructions so tha t there does not remain any necessity 
to asser t the logical ly percarious e n t i t i e s . Thus he switched 
over to phenomenalism. 
I t is important to mention that when Russell discarded 
his e a r l i e r view, he did i t s tep by s t ep . He f i r s t revised his 
view regarding matter . An elaborate exposition on matter is 
given in his Our Knowledge of the External Worlds written in 
1914. And then he proceeded with revision of his view on 
mind which appeared in his Analysis of Mind, published in 
1921. In th is way f ina l ly he reached to Netural Monism, 
3n 
So the problem at hand is how to establish an Indepen-
dent physical world. Now Russell maintains that sense-data 
themselves constitute the object of knowledge and are not 
representative of anything beyond themselves. The view that 
sense-data represents something of which they are functions 
is, according to Russell, a product of an unfortunate blend-
ing of our two beliefs — one that there must be something 
persisting independently of being known in sensation and the 
other that the changing appearance of a thing is due to 
changes in our position and not in the thing itself, our 
instinctive faith in the persistence of objects of knowledge 
is the root cause of belief in the existence of an indepen-
dent physical world. 
But, strictly speaking, anything we are entitled to 
asseri: is that which we experience at a given moment. Matter 
of physics, even if it exists, is quite elusive to our 
direct experience. Now Russell holds a peculiar position and 
reduces physical world into the actual sense-data plus those 
ones which are possible. He gives the name •sensibilla' to 
the possible sense-data. 
Russell proposes to reduce substantial material thing 
into sensibilla which includes both actual and possible 
sensa. Hypothetical sensa are not experienced; their knowledge 
is inferred from actual sensa. But the question is why we 
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infer hypothetical sensa from the sense-data ? Why do we 
not infer from them substantial material thing ? For 
Russell, the reason is tbat the latter ihvolves more risk 
than the former. Unexperienced sensa are similar in their 
nature and status with the experienced data, while the 
material things are radically dissimilar and different. 
Senslbilia are what are capable of being experienced whereas 
the things are utterly inexperiencible. Therefore, it is 
safer to infer the former as against the latter. 
It is necessary to make the distinction between sense-
data and sensibilia; for whereas the former form our most 
indubitable knowledge, the latter, being inferred, admit 
an element of doubt. It is obvious that all sense-data are 
sensibilia but the converse is not true. Russell illustrates 
the relation between sense-data and sensibilia by the analogy 
of husband and man. All husbands are men but not all men 
are husbands. Moreover, as a man becomes a husband after 
entering in the relation of marriage so does become the 
sensibilia, sense-data after being a term of experiential 
relation. 
After reducing the commonsense world into sensibilia 
what remains for Russell is to provide it with the persistence 
and permanence as well as objectivity that the former enjoyed. 
In other words, he had to construct upon the debris of 
4' 
coinnonsense world, a real spatio-temporal world consisting 
only of sensory objects, 
Morris Weltz In his article comments that the view that 
senslbllia exist apart from acquaintance is accepted by 
Russell as a metaphysical hypothesis which like many of his 
4 
hypotheses, is justified by the principle of continuity. 
The function of senslbllia is to replace the 'matter' 
and 'physical object' of the Problems of Philosophy* Both 
of them can be constructed out of senslbllia. By a logical 
construction Russell means 'the substitution of a symbol 
whose denotation Is given in sense-experience or Is contin-
uous with and similar to something given in senseexperience 
for a symbol whose denotation Is neither given in sense-
experience nor is similar to and continuous with something 
given in sense-experience but Is postulated as an empirical 
Inferred entity',^ 
For constructionism, then, a symbol of physical objects 
no longer denotes an entity which was postulated as the cause 
of our sense-data and whose intrinsic nature is a mystery to 
us. Rather it denotes a whole class of appearances which 
Includes sense-data also those senslbllia which, on grounds 
4. Morris Weitz, "The Unity of Russell's Philosophy", 
The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. by Paul Arthur 
Schllpp, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc, Evanston, 
Illinois (1964), p. 65. 
5, Ibid, pp, 65-66, 
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of continuity and resemblance* are to be regarded as belong-
ing to the same system of appearances, although there happen 
to be no obseirver to whom they are data. 
Though Russell was not in a position to say anything 
substantial about mental world when he was busy with the 
construction of external physical world, he still remained 
a dualist, making references to mental facts as those which 
involve awareness. Sensation is the simplest kind of mental 
fact. It is to be distinguished from sensibilia and sense-
data. Russell writes, "By a sensation I mean the fact con-
sisting in the subjects awareness of the sense-dataum". 
Russell now opines that the subject is mental because it is 
a constituent in a mental complex (e.g. sensation) and the 
only constituent which is not physical. In 'On the Nature 
of Acquaintance* Russell argued that the subject cannot be 
known to be either mental or physical because we are not 
acquainted with it. But in Mysticism and Logic Russell 
changes his view and says that the subject is inferred as 
mental because it appears in a mental fact, sensation, which 
contains no other mental constituent and, therefore, it must 
be mental in ortier for sensation itself to be mental. The 
significance of this argument is that once again we may 
assert that there are mental particulars, which are defined 
as those constituents of mental facts that are aware of 
something. 
6. Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, Longmans, oreen and 
Co., 39, paternoster Row, London (1919), p. 152, 
It is plain that for Russell world of physics Is a 
construction out of empirical data. Prom 1914 until 1928 
Russell's philosophical contribution consisted, to a great 
extent* In the fornulatlon and exemplification of the 'method 
of constructionism* as applied to fundamental natural sciences, 
physics and psychology. 
One of the easy ways to understand constructionism is 
In its historical setting as a philosophy of science. Since 
the seventeenth century there have been many philosophies 
of science. Some of them are j (1) the view that the func-
tion of philosophy Is to accept completely the results of 
science and to generalize these results so that they embrace 
all aspects of reality, including human experience. The 
philosophy of evolutionism advocated by Spencer is example 
of this kind of view; (11) There is the theory of Hume, 
that the function of philosophy, in relation to science, is 
to challenge the assumptions of science, specifically, 
induction, causality and substance; (ill) philosophers like 
Berkeley regard the function of philosophy, so far as 
science is concerned, to be one of sharp reconstruction; 
and (Iv) finally there is the view of philosophers like 
Kant who maintain that the function of a scientific philo-
sophy is the Justification of science, either as a method 
or as a body of knowledge. 
/* 
But Russell considers the role of philosophy to be the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of sc ience. Unlike Hume he does not seek to 
challenge science in order to transform our knowledge into 
scepticism. Nor does he wish, l ike Berkeley, to reconstruct 
science in terms of experience in order to es tabl i sh some 
sort of pan-psychism. Russel l ' s challenge to and his recons-
truction of science i s motivated by his desire to jus t i fy 
sc ience. 
Russel l ' s great contribution i s his jus t i f i ca t ion of 
sc ience , considered as a body of knowledge, and not as a 
set of techniques or pr inc ip les . I t i s this which d i s t i n -
guishes him from Kant» since Kant's energy was primarly 
directed towards the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the methodology of 
sc ience , e spec ia l ly induction. 
When a s c i e n t i f i c philosophy functions as a j u s t i f i -
cation of sc i ence , i t i s ident ical with constructionism. 
There are , in any of the natural sc i ences , certain symbols 
for e n t i t i e s which we never experience. The function of 
constructionism, in regard to these e n t i t l e s , i s neither to 
affirm nor to deny the ir ex i s t ence , but to replace the 
symbols for these e n t i t i e s by other symbols. That I s , to 
subst i tute symbols whose denotata are e i ther given d irec t ly 
in sense-experience or are s imilar to and continuous with 
what i s given in sense-experience for symbols whose deno-
tata are not given in sense-experience but are postulated 
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as inferred e n t i t l e s completely iinlike those given in 
sense-experience. This subst i tut ion of empirical for un-
empirical symbols means that s c i e n t i f i c symbols are defined 
in sensory terms• which val idates the claim of natural 
science that i t i s empirical* 
The process whereby empirical symbols replace unempi-
r lca l symbols has two d i s t i n c t parts : (1) to determine what 
are the wholly or part ia l ly empirical e n t i t i e s , and ( i i ) 
to define the symbols of science in terms of the wholly 
or part ia l ly empirical e n t i t i e s * 
The determination of the wholly empirical ultimate 
e n t i t i e s was completed by Russell in his Problems of 
Philosophy* There he employed two principles in order to 
es tabl i sh the ultimate e n t i t i e s of r ea l i ty : the cartesian 
method of doubt and the method of hypothesis. The f i r s t 
gave him the ultimate empirical and conceptual e n t i t i e s , 
the second the ultimate inferred e n t i t i e s . Instance of the 
f i r s t are sense-data and universals; of the second, other 
minds and physical objects* 
In Mysticism and Logic, Russell accepted completely 
the doctrine that the wholly empirical ultimate e n t i t i e s 
are sense-data. Besides these , Russell invented unsensed 
s e n s i b i l i a as e n t i t i e s . Thei^ e are inferred and similar to 
4c. 
and continuous with sense-data, except that no one Is aware 
of them. 
It would be wrong to think that constructionism does 
not employ as ultimate denotata of scientific symbols any 
Inferred entitles, because we have seen that Russell admitted 
unsensed senslbllla In Mysticism and Logic. It Is only In the 
Our Knowledge of the External World that Russell construes 
constructionism as the method which dispense with all 
inferred entities as valid constituents of constructions. 
But In Russell's other constructionist works both wholly and 
partially empirical entities are employed. 
In our Knowledge of the External World, Russell contends 
that the only acceptable entitles of constructions are the 
wholly empirical ones, sense-data. Here it is seen that 
Russell has rejected unsensed senslbllla. Before we discuss 
the reason for rejection of unsensed senslbllla, let us pay 
our attention to the method which discloses the ultimate 
wholly empirical character of sense-data, the Cartesian 
method of doubt. The method of doubt %*as first put into 
practice by Russell In Problems of Philosophy, not upon the 
propositions of science, but upon ordinary common-sensleal 
propositions. The Problems of Philosophy was opened with the 
question : "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so 
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certain that no reasonable man can doubt It 7" This quest 
for certainity is the distinctive inquiry of constructionism, 
because it is the result of this quest which comprises the 
empirical and logical premisses of constructionism. This, 
then, is the initial task of constructionism : to take a body 
of propositions and to practice doubt upon them in order to 
establish a sort of system in which the least dubious pro-
positions constitute the premisses of the entire system 
of propositions. 
In the problems of Philosophy Russell has evolved a 
hierarchy of propositions which are most certain. The propo-
sitions cibout which we are roost certain are those about 
sense-data and logic. 
In Our Knowledge of the External World another 
hierarchy has been presented. But he introduced some new 
technical terms, e.g.» 'hard-data*, 'soft data'. Hard data 
are those propositions which are luminously certain and 
soft data are those propositions about whose truth we are 
no longer certain when we practice doubt upon them. Russell 
included our knowledge of the sense-data, logic, recent 
memory, introspection, relations of time and space, and 
universals in the category of hard data. Knowledge of 
physical objects and others mind are included in soft data, 
7. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London, 
Williams & Norgate (1912;, p. 9, 
We s h a l l now return to the basic empirical e n t i t i e s 
of constructionism as presented in the External World. In 
this book Russell defined 'unsensed s e n s i b i l i a ' as the 
functions of 'sensed sens ib i l ia* i . e . sense-data. Thus he 
completely reduced inferred as part ia l ly empirical e n t i t i e s 
to the wholly empirical e n t i t i e s thus sat i s fy ing the require-
ments of the construct ionist ideal : a l l Inferences to 
unknown e n t i t i e s are replaced by constructions out of known 
e n t i t i e s i . e . sense-data. 
However, again we see a s h i f t in Russel l 's view in 
"The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" and in his l a s t two 
major works on Physics, v i z . . Analysis of Mind and Analysis 
of Mattery. Here he reverted t o the posit ion that the ultimate 
denotata : of symbols of physics are e i ther wholly or part ia l ly 
empirical. In the l a t t e r works, the basic wholly empirical 
e n t i t i e s are perceptual events and the basic part ia l ly 
empirical e n t i t i e s are unperceived events . These are Inferred 
as ( i ) continuous with perceptual events , by means of causal 
theory of perception and ( i i ) s imilar to perceptual events , 
with the aid of the general theory of neutral monism. 
Russell thinks that every concept of physics , e . g . , space, 
time, po ints , e l ec trons , e t c . can be interpreted as a 
function of these perceptual and unperceived events . 
8, Bertrand Russel l , Mysticism and Logic, Longmans, Green 
and Co. , 39 , Paternoster Row, London, 1919, pp. 125-144. 
In his vnrltings, Russell applied constructionism to 
the natural sc iences . Let us take one example, construction 
of point , from his External World, 
Russell wr i tes , "It Is not easy to see any way In which, 
as independent e n t i t l e s , they (points) could be val id ly 
Inferred from the data, t h u s . . . we shal l have, i f poss ib le , 
to find some log ica l construction, some complex assemblage 
of immediately given objec t s , which wi l l have the geometrical 
9 properties required of points". The empirical objects which 
have these requis i te properties are sense-data. Now the 
question i s i what are i t s obvious projjertles. We know that 
i t i s always of some f i n i t e extent . Any visual datum, e . g . , 
has a surface which i s never ostensibly inf in i tes imal . 
Furthermore, a sense-datum, which i s prima fac ie one 
undivided whole, may upon s t r i c t a t tent ion , be broken up 
into i t s constituent parts . Whenever this phenomenon occurs, 
we have one part contained within a d i f ferent part and 
ent ire ly enclosed by i t . The re lat ion of 'enclosure' , which 
i s given in sense-experience, i s the f i r s t property of 
sense-data iWiich wi l l enable us to define 'points ' in terms 
of them. 
9. Bertrand Russel l , Our Knowledge of the External World; 
The Open Court Publishing Company, London, 149 Strand, 
W.C , p. 114. 
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The second requisite property has to do with certain 
hypotheses which are attributed to the relation of enclosure, 
What we desire. In order to define 'points* In terms of 
sense-data and enclosure. Is that a set of visual data, 
considered as volumes or surfaces, should get smaller and 
smaller so that of any two of the sets there Is always one 
that encloses the other. This desideratum Is satisfied with 
the aid of certain hypotheses. The hypotheses required for 
the relation of enclosure are : 
"(1) It must be transitive; 
(2) of two different spatial objects, it Is 
Impossible for each to enclose the other, 
but a single spatial object always 
encloses Itself; 
(3) any set of spatial objects such that 
there is at least one spatial object 
enclosed by them all has a lower limit 
or minimum, i.e. , an object enclosed by 
all of them and enclosing all objects 
which are enclosed by all of them; 
(4) to prevent trivial exceptions, we must 
add that there are to be Instances of 
enclosure, i.e., there are really to 
be objects of which one encloses the 
other".^° 
10. Ibid, p, 115, 
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Writes Russell* "when an enclosure-relation has these 
properties, we will call it a 'point-producer". 
Russell added two more hypotheses to gu.irantee that sp'ice 
is infinite. These two hypothesis are s (i) Any object which 
encloses itself also encloses an object other than itself* 
(ii) Next hypothesis is concerned with an enclosure series -
i.e., a set of objects in which, of any two of them, one is 
contained in the other - converging to a point. In Russell's 
own word t "Let our enclosure series be such that, given any 
other enclosure series of which there are members enclosed 
in any arbitrary chosen member of our first series, then 
there are members of our first series enclosed in any arbl-
12 trary chosen member of our second series". when this sixth 
hypothesis is realized, the first series is called by Russell 
• punctual enclosure-series', 
After a long journey Russell now proceeds to define a 
•point', as it is conceived by mathematical physics. Point 
is a logical construction which has as its constituent "... 
all the objects which enclose members of a given punctual-
series". This definition, Russell concludes, is. sufficient 
to express all that geometry requires. 
11. Ibid^ p. 115, 
12. Ibid, p. 115. 
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NEUTRAL MONISM 
Having adopted the doctrine of phenomenalism, Russell 
had already travelled half the distance towards neutral monism. 
The doctrine of neutral monism is the ultimate destination 
towards which the phenomenalistic analysis of experience 
logically leads. In phenomenalism we abandon the concept of 
material things due to its inferred and precarious character. 
But is not mind, as an independent substance, amendable to 
the same treatment ? Is not its charadter as much inferred 
and therefore precarious as that of matter 7 we are never 
Introspectlvely aware of our bare selves. We infer it from 
the bits of experiences which it is supposed to abide and 
Inhere. The belief in mind as an independent substance is 
therefore psychologically not primitive, but derivative. So 
it should be replaced by something else which it is supposed 
to be presented to. Thus phenomenalism has paved the way for 
neutral monism. 
The doctrine of neutral monism has a long history. 
Before we go to trace that history, let us state briefly 
what is generally meant by neutral monism. 
The proponents of neutral monism hold that mind and 
matter are not two radically different kinds of entities, 
but both are constructed out of the same 'stuff. It is not 
of course denied that there Is some difference between the 
mental and the physical. But It Is said that the difference 
is one of relations, not of stuffs. The neutral stuff, or 
the bits of it which may be called neutral entities, may 
be arranged in different ways accox?ding to different types 
of relation. A group of neutral entities arranged in one 
way» by vitrue of one set of relations, will be a piece of 
matter* The same neutral entities arranged in another way, 
by virtue of another set of relations, may constitute a mind 
or a series of mental events. The neutral entities considered 
by themselves, apart from either set of relations, are 
neither mental nor physical. This is the reason why they 
are called neutral. 
This is a general and simplified outline of neutral 
monism. Almost all versions of neutral monism fall within 
this frame%#Drk, What are the ordering relations of the mental 
and material worlds respectively is one of the great questions 
concerning neutral monism - a question to which different 
versions of the theory provide different answers. 
Neutral monism appears to be inspired by two main 
objectives ; (1) to get rid of psycho-physical dualism which 
has become a contentious issue in philosophy since the time 
of Descartes, and (11) propensity towards empiricism. The 
'stuff of the neutral monists is not any kind of hidden 
5 ;^ 
unpercelvable substance. I t i s not something which l i e s 
behind and beyond the phenomenal world. I t cons is ts in some 
sort of d i rec t ly perceivable e n t i t i e s - e . g . , sensat ions , 
sense-data, colours , e t c . Thus i f matter i s wholly constructed 
out of any such d irec t ly experienceable s tu f f , there wi l l be 
nothing in i t which wi l l not be empirically ver i f i ab l e . The 
same wi l l be true of mind. 
Let us return to the history of neutral monism. Before 
Russel l , Earnest Mach and William James propounded this 
doctrine. Russel l 's re lat ion to this doctrine i s very pecu-
l i a r . When he was working as a lecturer of philosophy at 
Har%>ard, he for the f i r s t time encountered th is doctrine. 
The time we are referring to i s 1914 A.D. His reaction, how-
ever, was altogether h o s t i l e . His a r t i c l e "On the Nature of 
Acquaintance" was indeed a polemic against Mach's and James* 
doctrine. But his subsequent writing l ike "The Philosophy 
of Logical Atomism" (an a r t i c l e ) marks a gradual rea l i sat ion 
about the ineff icacy of certain objections he made against 
the doctr ine . F ina l ly , when he wrote The Analysis of Mind 
(published in 1921) he f u l l y acquisced in i t . 
I t w i l l make our task eas ier i f we give M^ account 
of Mach's and Jame's versions of neutral monism before taking 
up Russel l 's version, 
1. Bertrand Russel l , Logic and Knowledge, ed. by Robert Charles 
Marsh, London : George Allen & Unwln Ltd. (1956), pp, 
125-174. 
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EARLY HISTORY OF NEUTRAL MONISM I 
Earnest Mach In his Analysis of Sensations (first 
published In 1891) asks the question what grounds do we have 
for our belief in substance-concepts - physical as well as 
mental 7 
The table upon which I write is one that T have 
purchased five years ago. It has lost much of its shine. 
It has become a bit rough and has a number of spots of ink. 
It varies its colour according to the colour of light in 
the room. It completely disappears when I shut my eyes or 
when the light is put off. But despite all the changes that 
it has undergone I believe that it is the same table which 
I purchased five years ago. 
But where is that unchanged and permanent thing, i.e., 
table, IS it not that it is our sheer habit of thinking in 
a certain way to reify an otherwise nonfexistent entity. 
What Is true of physical substance is also true of 
mental substance. Suppose I am thinking over some philoso-
-phical problem. I exert my mind but nothing happens. I feel 
a little embarassed. But then suddenly I solve the problem 
and feel happy and relieved. Now I say that there is a 
2. Earnest Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, revised and 
supplemented from the fifth German edition by Sydney 
Waterlow, Chicago and London : The Open Court Publishing 
Company (1914), ch. "Introductory Remarks : Antlmetaphysical" 
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permanent and persistent 'I* which is busy in philosophising, 
which thinks one idea after another which feel embarassed 
and then happy. But where this permanent 'I* comes from ? 
What actually happened is merely a connected and concatenated 
series of bits of sensations* which we falsely claimed as 
belonging to a subsisting entity 'I*. This 'I* is never 
experienced and is therefore utterly non-existent, 
A critical reflection in this way eliminates both mind 
and matter and leaves only sensations about which it was 
hitherto supposed they were presented to mind and produced 
by matter. This sort of analysis may roughly be called as 
neutral monistic analysis of knowledge. As it is clear from 
the above explanation, it denies the relation that is said 
to be holding between the knowing mind and matter. There is 
no matter to produce sensations and there is no mind to 
receive them. Sensations themselves are the sole material 
out of which this universe is built up. These sensations 
when arranged in one way constitute the subject matter of 
physics and when in a different way, that of psychology. 
According to Mach^a physical body consists entirely 
of sensations or what he himself prefers to call 'elements' 
such as colours, sounds, tastes, etc and nothing beyond. 
But from the very fact that they are sensations modifiable 
by our sensing them, he says, it can be concluded that they 
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are also mental. Mach also argues for the neutrality of 
sensations by Invoking the fact that the so called mental 
and physical phenomena can interact assuming obviously the 
Cartesian idea that two substances of entirely different kind 
and character cannot interact* 
It may be objected that if sensations are only reality 
known to exist how can we account for the two functionally 
and radically different phenomena, viz., physical and 
psychical* We have a vivid and conspicuous knowledge of the 
bodies of our fellow men but we have not even the faintest 
idea of their minds which, we think, must be attached to 
their bodies as owis is attached to our own. For Mach, we 
can diffuse the physical and psychical phenomena into each 
other while yet retaining the distinction between the two. 
This can be accomplished by forming two groups in which the 
same elements occur with relations of a different nature. 
The element A (say, colour) is physical as long as it is 
studied and observed in its relation to various other colours 
(say, B) or sounds (say, C). But the same A becomes psychical 
when it is abstracted from its relation to B and c and 
observed in its relation to some previous knowledge (memory) 
of colour (say, cC) or corresponding memory of sound (say, ?>) 
William James approaches this doctrine from the stand-
point of a psychologist* A clear outline of this doctrine 
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was given by James in his work Essays in Radical Empiricism, 
Even in his psychology, James gave an incomplete version of 
it. In Essays he changed some of his earlier views. In 
Psychology James does not reject 'consciousness* as an 
independent substance, and even regards it as a fundamental 
datum of psychology, still an unconscious urge to dispense 
with it is fairly discernible in him. 
In his Psychology* James described four important 
characteristics of consciousness t (i) every state of it is 
subjective, (ii) it is in a state of constant flux, (iii) 
the flux or continuity of consciousness is experiencible, 
and (iv) it never comprehends its objects in their entiriety 
but always chooses the appropriate part of them. While the 
first and last characteristics later constituted the bases 
of Jame's celebrated pragmatic theory of truth, the second 
and the third, in which the changeable and fluctuating 
character of consciousness has been emphasized. paved the 
way for his future abandonment of consciousness as an 
independent substance. 
The central idea of his new philosophy, is stated 
by W, James in the following words i 
3, William James, Essays in Radical Empicism, Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 3^ paternoster Row, London (1912), 
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"My thesis Is that if we start with the 
supposition that there is only one primal 
stuff or material in the world, a stuff of 
which everything is composed, and if we 
call that stuff 'pure experience', then 
knowing can easily be explained as a parti-
cular sort of relation toward one another 
into which a portion of one experience may 
enter. The relation itself is a part of 
pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes 
the subject or the bearer of the knowledge, 
the other becomes object known". 
James claims to explain in terras of his theory, a 
paradox which, in his view, is one of the most puzzling 
questions in philosophy from the time of Democritus. The 
paradox is this : In common paralance the experience is con-
sidered to be a simple confrontation of mind with its object. 
At present I am seeing the room, table, pen etc which I 
think belong to the outside world. But in so far as l am 
perceiving them they are also inside my mind. The problem 
is how what appears to be only one reality can simultaneously 
exist at two places, Dualistic or representative theories 
contrive an idea which they say represents the outside thing 
4. Ibid, pe 4. 
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and belongs to the mind. But according to James, this 'Idea* 
is never experienced. He contends that mind unmediatedly 
encounters its objects in every case of experience. 
The puzzle, says James, can be easily unravelled if 
we abandon our habit to think mind and material things as 
being two opposite realms of being. There is only one iden-
tical room i.e, , its pure experience upon which two different 
sorts of processes converge, just as the point of intersection 
of two lines is virtually one but yet can be said to be 
belonging to two different lines, in the same way, one 
identical room can be said to be existing at two places at 
once. 
There are two processes going on simultaneously in the 
universe. One of these consists of sensations, emotions, 
volitions, in short, what we call ordinarily mental occu-
rrences. This process belongs to the personal biography of 
the perceiver. The room-experience, when it enters into this 
process it is loosely called mental. The other process in 
which the same room-experience enters comprises a -number 
of physical operations such as carpentering, furnishing, 
etc. This process is utterly independent of any one's experi-
« 
encing them and is the physical history of the room. 
Occurring in these two processes the experience also 
changes its character. As a physical room it can be experienced 
G ' 
by any number of people; as a mental room i t is s t r i c t l y 
personal and p r i v a t e . As a physica l room i t w i l l take a 
c e r t a i n amount of time and labour to demolish i t but as a 
mental room i t can be destroyed in a second - simply by 
c los ing the eyes . 
Though our main conceim i s o n t o l o g i c a l , s t i l l i t w i l l 
be an i n t e r e s t i n g discuss ion as t o how James proposes to 
so lve the epis temological problems, According to James, 
knowledge i s e i t h e r a d i r e c t confrontat ion of one experience 
with another one, o r a process in which one experience passes 
through c e r t a i n intermediary experiences in to another 
exper ience . In any case , i t i s the experience i t s e l f t h a t 
i s knower and t h a t i s known; the t ranscendenta l mind (to 
exporience) nnd the t ranscenden ta l t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f (to bn 
experienced) a re both n o n - e x i s t e n t . 
I t may be objected t h a t i f i t i s the experience i t s e l f 
which functions a t one time as th ing and a t another time as 
thought , then how are t he two phenomena q u a l i t a t i v e l y so 
d i f f e r e n t , A th ing is extended, coloured, hard o r s o f t , 
smooth or rough, but the thoughts can never possess these 
q u a l i t i e s , 
James disposes of t h i s objec t ion by saying t h a t 
thoughts do possess the q u a l i t i e s t h a t the things are sa id 
to possess . The thought of f i r e is as ho t , as hot is the 
G : 
actual f i r e and the thought of r iver is as wet as the 
actual r i ve r . The two phenomena differ only in that while 
the experience qua thing is active and effect ive , qua 
thought laclcs these charac te r i s t i c s ,^ 
I t may be mentioned here that jame's neutral monism 
was a t bottom an epistemological and not a metaphysical 
doctr ine. His 'pure-experience* was not a metaphysical 
subs t i tu te of mind and matter . Metaphysically, he was a 
p l u r a l i s t believing in the mul t ip l i c i ty of experiences -
a l l as the ult imate ontological constituents of the universe, 
I t were in fact some of his followers, l a t e r on known as 
New-Realists, who transformed i t from a theory of knowledge 
into a theory of r e a l i t y , 
Ru8aell*3 version t 
Mach approached the theory of neutral monism from 
the side of physics and James from the s ide of psychology, 
Russell approaches i t from the standpoints of both physics 
and psychology, txit in te res t ing ly enough, a physics unknown 
to Mach and a psychology unknown to James, The f i r s t two 
decades of the present century witnessed a great change in 
physics whose repercussions were also f e l t in the other 
domains of knowledge, pa r t i cu la r ly philosophy. Quantum 
5. Ibid, p . 33. 
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physics and the theory of Relat ivi ty metamorphosed the 
t r ad i t iona l notions of space, tijne and matter. The notion 
of absolute space and absolute time was replaced by a 
re la t ive space-time continuum and the t rad i t iona l notion 
of matter ceased to be as an en t i ty extended, indestruct ible 
and subs tan t i a l . Matter rather came to be considered as a 
mathematical construction out of inconceivably abstract 
e n t i t i e s , 
A corresponding rev&lution was created in the realm 
of psychology by the Behaviourists. Behaviourism was a 
culmination of reductive tendency in psychology which made 
i t s f i r s t appearance in the l a t e nineteenth century in 
Germany, Psychology got r id of 'consciousness* which i t 
has hi ther to regarded as i t s fundamental datum. 
At that time there were two opposite tendencies in 
the o rb i t of science - one eviscret ing matter of i t s 
'ma te r i a l i ty ' and other eviscret ing mind of i t s 'menta-
l i ty* • Russell thought himself to find in the doctrine of 
neutral monism a meeting ground, a conflux of these two 
confluent t ides of modem knowledge. His Analysis of Mind 
i s mainly directed towards th is goal. He opens the preface 
with the following words s 
"This book has grown out of an attempt 
to harmonize two different tendencies, 
6^ 
one in psychology, the other JLn physics, 
• • • , although at f i r s t s ight they might 
seem inconsistent . On the one hand, 
many psychologists, especial ly those of 
the behaviourist school, tend to adopt 
what is( essen t ia l ly a ma te r i a l i s t i c 
posi t ion, as a matter of method if not 
of metaphysics. They make psychology 
increasingly dependent on physiology 
and external observation and tend to 
think of matter as something much more 
sol id and indubitable than mind. Mean- -
while the physic is t , especial ly Einstein 
and other exponents of the theory of 
r e l a t i v i t y , have been making 'matter ' 
less and less mater ia l . Their world 
consists of ' even t s ' , from which 'matter ' 
is derived by a logical construction". 
Russell c lear ly elaborated the poss ib i l i t y of a reconci-
l i a t ion between the two in the same preface. He writes s 
"The view that seems to me to reconcile 
the mate r i a l i s t i c tendency of psychology 
with the an t i -ma te r i a l i s t i c tendency of 
physics is the view of William James 
6. Bertrand Russell, Analysis of Mind, London t George Allen 
Ei Unwin Ltd. , 1921, p , 5. 
and the American new r e a l i s t s ; according 
to which the ' s t u f f of the world i s 
nei ther mental nor mater ia l , but a 'neu-
t r a l stuff*• out of which both are 
7 
constructed". 
I t has been mentioned e a r l i e r that Russell 's reaction 
to the doctrine of neutral monism was f i r s t host i le and he 
rejected the theory. Let us f i r s t discuss the grounds on 
which he rejected the doctrine and then we sha l l see how 
did he do away with them. 
From the epistemological point of view there are two 
sources of the doctrine of neutral monism. One is the assvimp-
tion that what is presented to the mind unmediatedly must be 
part of i t and the other is the belief tha t physical things 
can be unmediatedly presented to the mind. I t was the a s s i -
milation of physical things with mind which led Mach and 
James to t he i r belief in the neut ra l i ty of the world s tu t f . 
Neutral monists. by emphasising the f i r s t rejected the 
•content theory' and by emphasising the second refuted 
idealism. Russell 's phenomenalism and the doctrine of neutral 
monism were in fact half way houses between the content theory 
and subjective idealism. 
7. Ibid, p . 6. 
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I t may be seen tha t the real issue was the existence 
of mind. If mind existed, neutral monism was wrong and if 
did not ex i s t , f^ussell's phenomenalism was incorrect , 
Russell 's main objection against neutral monism was based 
upon i t s i nab i l i t y to explain the mental occurrences. And 
as soon as he was able to explain these purely in physiolo-
gical tenns, he abandoned phenomenalism and accepted neutral 
monism, 
Russell f i r s t c r i t i c i s e d james' view pointing out 
that according to James in case of experience what is 
experienced comes into contact with another experience and 
not with any subsist ing mind. That whether a given patch of 
colour is experienced or not depends, according to thia view, 
upon whether or not i t i s related to some other experienced 
objects . One could experience the colour only when he has 
already experienced a t l ea s t one coloured object . But 
Russell thinks i t to be absurd. He thinks that i t is not 
possible to have an experience in absolute i so la t ion . The 
poss ib i l i t y of having an experience in absolute isolat ion 
f a l s i f i e s the neutral monist's belief tha t an occurrence 
can become experience only a f te r coming in relat ion with 
another experience. 
Another d i f f icul ty which prevented Russell firom 
accepting the neutral monistic theory was i t s inab i l i ty to 
explain ' b e l i e f , 'Be l i e f is different from 'sensation' 
[} 
in that whereas the latter has always a reference to some 
outside object, the former lacte any such reference. For 
example, when I believe in the proposition 'Today is 
Wednesday' there is no such entity called 'today is Wednes-
day* to which my belief is directed. In fact, belief is 
always about 'propositions' or 'judgements' not about 
•things' or 'facts'. Although we speak of our belief or 
disbelief in God as if it is some object, really it is not 
object in the logical sense of the word. It Is description 
and our belief in its simply means that we believe that 
there is an entity answering this description. Beliefs, 
thus, in all cases are objectless. But yet they perform a 
cognitive function. It follows therefore that there is 
necessarily a mind which knows something although no 
physical presentation of any kind is involved. 
Analogous cases in which the supposition of a mind 
seems to be necessary are those of memory and thoughts of 
non-temporal objects; when I remember an event which happened 
an hour ago, the same event is not presented to roe now. It 
is a replica of the previous event and being so it must be 
slightly changed. Now the alteration in the character of the 
event recollected can either be explained by assuming a mind 
whose contact with event is responsible for the change or 
believing that our present knowledge is mediated by some 
idea which represents the original event. The latter 
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possibility is upheld by the protagonists of content-theory 
and neither Russell nor neutral monists can accept it. 
Neutral monists reject the former possibility too and thus 
fail to explain this important phenomena. 
Apart from the above points Russell has shot«m many 
flaws of neutral monism. We shall not illustrate all of 
them here. Only one point which Russell explained very 
Q 
elaborately in 'Analysis of Experience' will be summarised 
in the next paragraph. 
According to Russell» 'emphatic particulars' (vizi 
'this', 'I', 'now') render the theory of neutral monism 
unacceptable, 'This' is a proper name which applies to an 
object to which I attend at a given moment. The subject 
that attends to 'this' is called 'I' and the time at which 
'I' and 'this' come in relation to each other is called 
'now** There is observed a peculiar intimacy and itntrediacy 
between •!• and 'this' and 'I' and 'now' which is quite 
absent in 'I's relation to other objects and at other 
times. Neutral monism does not give any satisfactory explana-
tion of this peculiar relationship. 
8. Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, 'On the Nature of 
Acquaintance', London ; George Allen & Unwin (1956), 
p. 159. 
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writes Russell : "for these reasons,.•• I conclude 
that neutral monism, though largely right In Its polemic 
against previous theories* cannot be regarded as able to 
deal with all the facts* and must be replaced by a theory 
In which the difference between %ihat Is experienced and what 
Is not experienced by a given subject at a given moment Is 
made simpler and more prominent than It can be In theory 
which wholly denies the existence of specifically mental 
entitles".^ 
Period of acceptance : 
Despite the above objections there were certain things 
In neutral monism which attracted Russell. Perhaps most 
Important among them was that It Is In line with the principle 
of Occam* s razor * which he regarded as the supreme methodo-
logical maxim In philosophizing, vte have seen In the last 
chapter that Russell had abandoned the notion of 'substance* 
from physics In his phenomenalism following Occam's razor. 
Acceptance of neutral monism amounted to nothing but to 
further carry out this plan. That Is by this means he could 
do away with 'mind' as well* which was admittedly a 'soft 
dataum'• 
The other reason which made neutral monism acceptable 
to Russell was that it conformed to the results of various 
9. Ibid, p. 159. 
emergent trends in science* Physics asserted that the matter 
Is not a substantial» extended entity; but a remote supra-
sensuous construction* connected no doubt with sense* but 
only through a long chain of Intermediate inferences. Physio-
logical psychology, on the other hand, said that the immediate. 
data of sense should be the subject matter of psychology 
rather than physics. 
In the preceding chapter we saw that Russell admitted 
possible *sensibllla* besides those actual. An aggregate of 
closely resembling sensibilia constituted the 'jAiysical 
thing* and its relation to mind constituted knowledge. On 
he 
this ground/admitted mind because he thought it unavoidable 
in explaining the essentially relational character of 
knowledge. Now if the theory of neutral monism were true, 
the supposition of mind was also unnecessary. The sensibilia 
themselves would do the function of a thing as well as of 
a mind. 
Since there were in neutral monism minimum of assump~ 
tions to be made in explaining knowledge, Russell felt 
strongly inclined to accept it. At the same time he found 
certain insurmountable difficulties in the doctrine. Important 
among them were those derived from the considerations about 
•emphatic particulars' and 'beliefs*. Russell's attitude 
towards this theory at this stage is indeed very intricate. 
7; 
There appears to be in him a struggle what he believed and 
What he ought to believe. In time* it vas the former which 
got the upper hand. He strirved harxi to find arguments which 
may enable him to dispense with the various difficulties. In 
his Logic and Knowledge he wrote : 
"••. the whole theory of neutral monism 
is pleasing to me* but I do find so far 
very great difficulty in bilieving it. 
You will find a discussion of the whole 
question in some articles I wrote.•• I 
should really want to rewrite them rather 
because I think some of the arguments I 
used against neutral monism are not 
valid".^° 
Prom tho above discussion it becomos clear that 
Russell f oiresaw a possible solution of his problem in neutral 
monism* but at the same time he was aware of certain for-
midable difficulties of this theory. Though he raised many 
interesting points at this Juncture, these were related to 
mainly eplstemologlcal inquiries. We shall now proceed to 
Russell's formulation of neutral monism. 
In the first chapter of his Analysis of Mind Russell 
writes t 
10. Ibid, p. 222, 
"The stuff of which the world of our 
experience Is composed of Is» In my 
belief, neither mind nor matter* but 
something more primitive than either. 
Both mind and matter seem to be compo-
site, and the stuff of which they are 
compounded lies In a sense between the 
two. In a sense above them both, like 
a common ancestor".^^ 
This primitive stuff (mentioned In the quotation) consists 
of 'aspects'. In the Analysis of Mind he generally calls 
this primitive stuff 'sensations'. It should be borne In 
mind that Russell now gives up the distinction between sen-
sations and sense-data. He believes the physical world to 
be constructlble out of sensations. Again, these elements 
are also supposed to enter into the construction of mind. 
So one and the same sense-datum be a constituent of both a 
mind and a table. Apart from the fact that there were also 
images and feelings, which entered only into the construction 
of minds, the difference between mind and matter was not a 
difference of substance, or content, but a difference in 
the arrangement of common elements. VThether a group of 
sense-data constituted, or helped to constitute, a mind or 
a physical object depended on the ways in which its members 
were related. 
11. Bertrand Russel, Analysis of Mind. London j George Allen 
& Unwln Ltd., (1927), p, 10. 
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Thus Russell has reached to the conclusion that 
"psychology and physics are distinguished by the nature of 
12 their causal laws, not by their subject matter", Ronald 
Jager in his The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy 
comments that Russell has approached the problem with a 
modest dogmatism, writes jager : 
"Russell approaches the subject with a modest 
dogmatism : a definite solution to the vene-
rable problems of mind and matter, and the 
painful mystries of Cartesian interaction is 
possible.•• along the lines marked out, but 
his (Russell's) may not be an entirely accu-
13 
rate exix>sition"» 
Before taking up the detai led discuss ion of Russel l 's 
monism l e t us enquire in to the genesis of the concept of 
sensation. In lecture VIII ( t i t l e d "Sensations and Images") 
of his Analysis of Mind, Russell gave an account of 
sensat ions. In the beginning of the chapter Russell says : 
"If the two sorts of causal laws could be 
sharply dis t inguished, we could c a l l an 
occurrence 'physical* when i t obeys causal 
12. Ibidm p, 287. 
13, Ronald Jager, The Development of Bertrand Russell's 
Philosophy, London t George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1972), 
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laws appropriate to the physical world, and 
•mental' when It obeys causal laws appro-
priate to the mental world. Since the mental 
world and the physical world Interact, there 
would be boundary bet*ieen the two j there 
would be events which would have physical 
causes and mental effects, while there 
would be others which %rould have mental 
causes and physical effects. Those that have 
physical causes and mental effects we should 
14 define as 'sensations'.** 
Giving this initial definition Russell says that this 
definition would have all the precision that could be desired 
if the distinction between physical and psychological causa-
tion were clear and shftrp. But as a matter of fact the 
distinction is by no means so sharp. Moreover it also suffers 
from the fact that an event may be an effect of several 
causes according to several causal laws : we cannot in 
general point to anything unique as the cause of such and 
such an event. 
Due to the above flaws of the given definition 
Russell proposes to develop a different definition. He 
14. Op.Clt. p. 138. 
15. Op. Clt. P. 139 
distinguishes sensation from perception somewhat as being 
raw material as compared to the finished product. Sensation 
is the analytic 'core* of perception, arrived at by a theo-
retical reduction of the fullness of perceptual experience 
to a logical and causal minimum* Perception of external 
objects comprises not only sensory encounter but also 
association, habit memory, classification and much else. 
Says Russell, "In order to arrive at what is really sensation 
in an occurrence.,, we have to pare away all that is due to 
habit or expectation or interpretation". Perception is 
sensation clothed; sensation is perception naked, remarked 
Ronald Jager. 
Sensations never exist alone. They are Isolated by 
thought but not in our actual experience. Sensation is not 
knowledge, though it is indespensible for empirical knowledge. 
There are some passages in his Analysis of Mind where Russell 
says that we could, by careful attention, actually isolate 
and focus on the sensational component of perception. But 
some commentators, e.g, Jager, say that this is not his 
principal idea. Figuratively it has been said that sensation 
stands to perception in somewhat the same way in which the 
letters of words stand to the sense of the sentence. The 
central logical feature of sensation and perception is 
put by Jager thus t "We sense sensations when we percelvn 
16. Ibid, p. 140. 
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physical objects. In sensation there Is no act/object 
17 distinction..." 
We have tried to give an account of constituents 
(i.e.* sensations) of physical and psychological world. 
Here Ronald Jager has made extensive survey of Russell's 
opinion and levelled several objections against Russell's 
view. We shall not discuss these objections here and directly 
proceed to see how Russell did away with mind by his neutral 
monism. 
In the first chapter we have seen that Russell 
admitted the existence of mind in his Problems of Philosophy. 
He admitted, though hesitantly, the possibility of being 
acquainted with the bare self. His argument was that when 
we perceive any object, what we perceive is the complex 
•self-acquainted with object*. Hence both the object and the 
self are in some sense objects of awareness. But in Our 
Knowledge of the External World, he denied this possibility 
Saying that it is not introspectively revealed to us. He, 
however, admitted its knowledge as knowledge by description. 
He was then quite convinced about its indespensability in 
explaining various mental occurrences. But as soon as he 
was able to explain these mental occurrences in non-psychical 
terms, he rejected the phenomena altogether. In the first 
17. Op.Cit. p. 333. 
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chapter of his Analysis of Mind, he surveys 'recent criticism 
of consciousness* and concludes thafe^ ^^ a^'^ &^ b^ t£j&8i^ ly be 
claimed as existing. 
What characterises In the ir^ ij^ the mental Wgenomena 
Is consciousness. There are different v#ays'"of being con-
scious viz, by perceiving, by remembering etc. what Is common 
In all these different ways of being conscious Is their 
object-dlrectedneas. We are always conscious of something. 
The consciousness and Its object seem to be two distinct 
terms, their relation being Irreducible. In traditional 
psychology, the knowledge consisted of three elements : 
the act (l.e, consciousness), the content and the object. 
Russell had already assimilated the object Into content by 
saying that the former were a function of the latter. He 
now endeavours to give a similar treatment to the remaining 
element. I.e. , act or subject. The act or subject Is also 
rendered a construction out of different bits of sensations 
which it was hitherto considered to be presented to. 
Consciousness should be disbelieved because it is 
not an object of acquaintance; nor is it Indespenslble 
In explaining facts. Following Mach and James, Russell too 
seeks our faith in consciousness as a persisting entity 
in our false language habit. We say : I think so and so', 
and it seems that there is something 'I' which is 
/ r 
transoendentally related to some object. But this is a 
false conclusion. There are, in fact, only thoughts collected 
into bundles such that one bundle is of my thoughts• other 
is that belonging to another person and so on. Thoughts 
of one collection are related to each other and it is their 
relation that constitutes the consciousness. A thought as 
subject comes in contact of another thought which functions 
as an object to the former thought and in this way the 
event called knowing occurs. •!* as a permanent substance 
is not an element in this relational system and therefore 
its supposition is superfluous. 
It is impoirtant to mention here that Russell, in 
denying mind and consciousness, does not deny mental 
phenomena' altogether. Behaviourists deny wholesale the 
presence of Images, feelings etc reducing them into some 
psychological change in the body, Russell does not go to 
that extent. According to him, we can deny Images of other 
minds. But we cannot deny our own images. The presence of 
•images' is unquestionable on purely experiencial grounds. 
We can think of a friend sitting in the chair although the 
chair is empty. He, however, says that talking of images 
as mental does not imply that they belong to some trans-
cendental substance. 
It can be safely stated that according to Russell 
mental life consists wholly of sensations and images. A 
distinction between these two constituents becomes essential. 
Traditionally, it is believed that sensations are 
vivid and active whereas the images are faint, fleeting 
and momentary. But Russell thinks that although these are 
characteristics which usually distinguish images from sensa-
18 tions, they do not do so invariably. What in the last 
analysis differentiates them is the difference of context* 
Sensations are caused by stimuli external to neirvous system 
on brain. Images, on the other hand, are caused by their 
association with sensations. Images too, like sensations, 
have causal relation to the outside physical object. But 
the object in this case belongs to the past and not to 
present. They are copies of sensations which we experienced 
of an object in the past. 
Moreover, images are private is a sense in which the 
sensations are not. A sensation seems to give us knowledge 
of some external thing while images appear to be internally 
excited. They, therefore, give knowledge of what is within 
ourselves. Images are thus quite similar to sensations in 
their intrinsic nature, they differ only in their being 
inside the brain. In other words, it can be said that they 
observe causal laws different from those observed by 
18, Ibidi p. 109, 
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sensations. 
Russell indeed says that there are operating two 
kinds of laws in our universe. There are things subject 
to physical laws (such as physical things) and there are 
things subject to psychological law (such as images). 
Sensations are subject to both laws and are therefore 
neutral physically and psychologically. There are no mental 
substances. The world is made up of the same stuff. It is 
only different sort of laws that make one particular be 
called mental and the other physical. 
Having rejected mind as a transcendental substance 
what remained for Russell to do was to construct a logical 
substitute which could do all the functions that were 
previously done by the subject. In 'Lecture VII' of his 
Analysis of Mind he made an attempt to perform this task, and 
20 to derive from it a definition of perception. 
In Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell, 
while constructing a logical substitute of material things, 
devised two ways of collecting together the particulars 
(in his own word 'sensibilia•). one way was to group them 
according to what he called the 'laws of perspective*. 
19. Ibid. p. 110. 
20. Ibid, p. 124. 
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Given any particular we £ind that there are around it a 
number of other particulars which differ from it in gra-
dually increasing degrees. This change 4d due to the change 
in perspective. A chair at a given moment gives a number of 
appearances when seen by a number of persons. The appeara-
nces differ from each other following the laws of perspective, 
In the Analysis of Mind, Russell again gives a 
description of the laws of perspective. Here he maintains 
that we can theoretically collect together a number of 
particulars which may be defined as the 'aspects' or 
•appearances* of one thing at one time. This set of parti-
culars (i.e. , those j>articulars which constitute one thing 
at one time) is called by Russell a 'mometary thing*. In 
the preceding paragraph we have given the example of chair. 
Borrowing a term from Russell we can safely say that the 
set of appearances of a chair (at a given moment) is equal 
to *mometary chair*. Now Russell says that to define that 
series of 'momentary things* that constitute the successive 
states of one thing is a problem involving the laws of 
21 dynamics. So what appears is that "a momentary thing is 
a set of particulars, while a thing (which may be identified 
with the whole history of thing) is a serled of such sets 
of particulars. The particulars in one set are collected 
together by the laws of perspective; the successive sets 
21. Ibid, P. 125. 
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are collected together by the laws of dynamics", 
Russell is ready to revise this two-fold way of 
arranging particulars (what has been stated in the last 
paragraph) and build up a construct which will be a subs-
titute of mind-substance. He writes clearly : "Instead of 
first collecting together all the particulars constituting 
a momentary thing, and then forming the series of successive 
sets, we might have first collected together a series of 
successive aspects related by the laws of dynamics, and 
then have formed the set of such series related by the 
23 laws of perspective," Russell has explained his view by 
a beautiful example of an actor on the stage. But since 
we have earlier taken the example of chair, it will be 
convenient to pursue that example itself. In the case of 
the chair, the first plan would be to collect together all 
the aspects which it presents to different observers at a 
given moment and then to form a series of such collections 
or sets belonging to other moments. The other plan is to 
collect together all the aspects which it presents in 
successive moments to a given observer and then to do 
the Same with other observers, A set of such series would 
be the 'mental chair', or 'biography* of the chair in 
Russell's own words. The second plan in which we form a 
22, Ibid, p. 126, 
23. Ibid, p. 126, 
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set of series Instead of a series of sets will be a 
concern of psychology Instead of physics. For it tells us 
not what the chair Is but what Impressions It Is producing 
for me. 
It Is clear that according to Russell every jjartl-
cular has a two-fold location* It is simultaneously a 
member of two groups : on the one hand It Is a member 
of the group which constitutes the objective physical thing 
and on the other It belongs to 'biography*• For Instance, 
when I see a star, my seeing of It has a dual reference. 
On the one hand It belongs to a group of particulars which 
is objectively existing in the perspective space and is 
studied by physics. And on the other hand, it is a part 
of the observer's personal biography and is a subject 
matter of psychology. 
It should be borne in mind that when Russell speaks 
of biography, he does not necessarily mean by it the mind. 
The observer may be a human being or a camera or dictaphone, 
A camera will record the occurrences on its plate in the 
same manner as they are recorded by us in our brain. 
Russell clearly writes : "Our twofold classification of 
particulars gives rise to the dualism of body and bio-
graphy in regard to everything in the universe, and not 
only in regard to living things.,. This dualism has 
nothing to do with any 'mind* that I may be supposed to 
possess; It exists in exactly the same sense i£ I am 
24 
replaced by a photographic plate". 
The only difference between the nature of experience 
by a photographic plate and that of a living organism 
is that while in the former the occurrence is a mere 
occurrence, in the latter it leads the observer to recall 
some previous occassion on which he had experienced the 
same occurrence, or some occurrence which is related to 
it. This fact of an experience of present moment being 
correlated with a similar experience that occured in the 
25 past is what Russell calls •muemenic phenomena'. It 
characterises the experiences of living organisms as 
against those of photographic plates. Human beings perceive 
while the photographic plates only sense. 
In the subsequent phase of his philosophy, Russell 
retained his position of the neutrality of ultimate 
occurrences constituting the universe. He, however, again 
changed his epistemological standpoint. Since our primary 
concern is his ontology, we will not enter into that 
discussion. 
24. Ibid, p, 129, 130, 
25. Ibid, p. 131. 
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C O N C L U 3 I O W 
It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that 
Russell retained his position of the neutrality of ultimate 
occurrences constituting the universe during the remaining 
xseriod of his philosophical career* But there is some pecu-
liarity in his position* 
Russell's The Analysis of Mind vas published in 1921, 
In 1927 The Analysis of Matter appeared. This book is very 
important in that it contains his most mature ideas concerning 
various philosophical issues* In his last philosophical 
writing My Philosophical Development (published in 1959) he 
did not have anytliing new to add what had already been 
written in The Analysis of Matter. In order to ma Ice explicit 
the peculiarity* mentioned in the first paragraph of this 
chapter* let us start with Russell's main problem, i.e., 
epistemological problem* 
There is s(Mne controversy among critics and commen-
tators about Russell's position in Analysis of Matter 
vis-a-vis in Analysis of Mind. In the Analysis of Mind 
Russell propounded a nonrelational theory of perception. 
He repudiated causal connection supposed to be existing 
between the subject and-the object* Neutral monism held both 
mind and matter to be non-existent and hence denied any 
sr. 
relation between them. But interestingly Russell advocates 
very explicitly a causal theory of perception in his 
Analysis of Matter* This duality of mind and matter seems 
to be going against the theory of neutral monism* But Russell 
continues to call himself a neutral monist. Advocating these 
two divergent views at a time seems to be inconsistent 
philosophically, 
A failure in reconciling these two apparently diver-
gent traits in Russell*s philosophy created a lot of confu-
sions in the writings of his various commentators. w.T. 
Stace, for example, in his article "Russell's Neutral 
Monism" talks as though Russell in Analysis of Matter 
drifted from his position of Analysis of Mind. He says, 
"The Analysis of Matter (1928), though it is true that it 
contains some elements of neutral monism, belongs on the 
whole to a later phase of Russell's tought, in which scien-
tific realism and the causal theory of perception have 
finally gained the upper hand. I understand that Russell 
himself does not recognize that there is any important 
difference between what I would thus distinguish as two 
phases of his thought",^ On the other hand Ronald jager, 
the author of The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy 
does not see any important difference in the philosophies 
1. W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. by 
P.A. Schilpp (1946), "Russell's Neutral Monism". The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 
P. 355. 
8' 
envisaged in two books. He contrasts Russell's neutral 
monistic theory of perception with that which he (Russell) 
advocated as being a phenomenalist, implying as if the 
neutral monism were a single theory, writes Jager, "The 
theory of perception which he (Russell) builds into neutral 
monism is different in fundamental respects from the theory 
2 
built earlier into his logical atomism**• It appears that 
for Jager there is some unitary doctrine of perception which 
Russell adheres to in his two consecutive boolcs which for 
him (Jager) differ in some fundamental respects with his 
earlier philosophy. 
without consulting the above-mentioned cotmnentators 
if we go through independently through Russell's two boolcs. 
Analysis of Mind and Analysis of Matter, it becomes clear 
that the epistemology of the latter book is radically different 
from his earlier book. Moreover the two are radically dissi-
milar from his (Russell's) phenomenalism. Again some statements 
of Russell baffle us to get any clear picture of his stand. 
One such statement is made in his "Reply to Criticism" 
contributed to the Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (ed, by 
P.A. Schilpp), Refferring to the criticism made by Stace 
in his article "Russell's Neutral Monism . Russell says. 
2. Ronald Jager, The Development of Bexrtrand Russell's 
Philosophy, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd, (1972) 
P. 354, 
^ ^ 
"I am rather sorry that he (stace) excluded the Analysis of 
Matter from the scope of his discussion, because, although 
there Is some change of view In this book. In the main 
there Is a fuller and more careful statement of theories 
not very different from those of the Analysis of Mind. I 
cannot understand why Mr. Stace holds that neutral monism 
must not regard physical objects as causes of sense data", 
J" 
The puzzle. It seems, can be resolved by distinguishing 
the eplstemology of neutral monism from Its metaphysics. It 
may be said that Russell became eplstemologlcally a causa-
11st while metaphysically persisting as a neutral monlst. 
It Is generally presumed that a non-relational theory of 
knowledge is a logical concomitant of the doctrine of neutral 
monism as it denies the existence of dual realities of mind 
and matter which supposedly come in relation to each other 
to constitute knowledge. But in the case of Russell this 
presumption is not applicable. Russell was well-acquainted 
with the contemporary development of physics. Various consi-
derations from the quantam physics and theory of relativity 
enabled him to develop an ontology from which he was able 
to derive a causal theory of knowledge without indulging 
in any inconsistency. Perhaps, again, it is physics which 
3. Bertrand Russell, "Reply to Criticisms", The Philosophy 
of Bertrand Russell, ed, by P.A. Schilpp, The Library of 
Living Philosophers, INC, Evans ton, Illinois (1946)!» 
pp. 706-7. 
led him to adopt a causal theory abondoning his non-
relational theory of knowledge which he advocated at the 
penultimate stage of his philosophical career. He seems to 
have thought this theory (causal theory) to be more In 
conformity with the results of physics than the non-relational 
one. Let us clarify this point. 
Physics tells us that knowledge occurs when some light 
currents proceed from an outside physical object and strike 
the nervous system of the percipient. These rays send a 
message to the brain on which the image of the object is 
imprinted. This interpretation of knowledge certainly In-
volves Inference, But Inferences are Indespenalble so long 
as we do not want to plunge Into solipsism. Phenomenalism 
as well as neutral monism admitted Inferences when they 
Include among the sensations those that were not one's data 
at a given moment. Russell thinks the causal theory a good 
scientific theory. In his Analysis of Matter he writes, "It 
(causal theory) has... all the merits of a good scientific 
theory - i.e. its verifiable consequences are never found 
4 
to be false". How he was concerned to conform his view 
with physics laecomes clear frcm his statement ",,, physics 
might be expected to collapse if perceptions have no 
4. Bertrand Russell. The Analysis of Matter (1954), George 
Allen And unwln Ltd. , Ruskin House Museum street, 
London, p. 197. 
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external causes". 
Incidentally v#e may quote here a passage from his 
writings in order to show how Russell considers inference 
to be indespensible for philosophical discussion. In reply 
to the criticism made by Stace (Stace commented that 
Russell's attempt to construct matter out of verifiables 
only turns out to be nothing but a fraud) Russell wrote : 
"The question arises : What is meant by 'Verifiables ? • 
If it means 'things that I experience', or things that 
human beings experience', then, I will admit, I do not see 
how to construct out of such materials alone a world that 
we can soberly believe to be complete, I will also admit 
that, at times, I have hoped to find such materials suffi-
cient, I still hold that they are sufficient for everything 
that is empirically verifiable. But I have found that no 
one, not even the most emphatic empiricist, is content with 
what can be empirically verified. It has gradually become 
clear to roe that empiricists (including, at times, my 
former self) allow a great many shaky inferences, and shrin 
from much valid analysis, in order to reconcile there faith 
in empiricism with every-day beliefs which they are not 
prepared to abandon. We all believe In other people, cats, 
and dogs, chairs and tables, and even other side of the moon, 
5. Ibid, p. 197, 
r 
My real problem Is : Vfhat are the minimum assumptions which 
will justify such beliefs ? 
"But the word *verifiables* is capable of meaning 
something wider than 'things that human beings experience', 
and does not mean something wider in the ordinary usage of 
science. Science, v^en it believes itself to have established 
a causal law, allows itself to believe in things which cannot 
be observed, and so does common sense. We conclude without 
hesitation that so-and-so is angry when he behaves in a 
certain %«ay, sflthough we cannot observe his anger. In a 
sense, an entity may be said to be 'verifiable' when it 
has been inferred in accordance with the recognized canons 
of scientific method. In this sense, I do wish to dispense 
with 'unverifiable* entities. This is my reason for doing 
without matter, points, instants etc. It is my reason for 
the use of Occam's razor, since, wherever that implement can 
shave away an entity, the inference to the entity in 
question thereby loses its force. All my somewhat elaborate 
constructions are designed to reduce inferred entities to 
a minimum. But if entities are validly Inferred, I do not 
think they can be rightly called 'Unverifiables' In the 
sense in which this word is commonly used in science", 
6. Op.Cit, pp. 707-8. 
The above quotation Is a lucid clarification of 
Russell's view about Inference and I think If It Is under-
stood correctly It would do away with many confusions and 
questions raised by commentators. 
In Analysis of Matter Russell reformulated his problem 
of perception by first taking up the question of knowing. 
In his Problems of Philosophy and Our Knowledge of the 
External World, he described the relation occurring between 
the knower and the known as 'acquaintance* meaning by it 
a simple and straight forward encounter between the subject 
and its object. But %fhen in Analysis of Mind, he came to 
adhere to the theory of neutral monism, he dropped altogether 
the notion of acquaintance. In his view there was no inde-
dependent mind to be acquainted with the object. Therefore, 
the whole notion of acquaintance was redundant. The data or 
the sensations were in themselves knowledge in being accom-
panied with mnemic phenomena. 
But again when he comes to his Analysis of Matter, he 
becomes sceptical about the feasibility of this view. His 
inclination towards the basic distinction and duality bet-
ween the act of knowing and the object of it is evident. 
In visual and tactual experiences, the duality is irredu-
cible. He considers that memory also provides the instance 
in which the distinction between the act of recollecting 
3 
and the object recollected Is conspicuous. Jameslean theory 
of neutral monism Is now repugnant to Russell in as much 
as It (neutral monism) denied this duality. 
With the reappearance of the relation of 'knowing', 
the 'data* which was dropxsed in the Analysis of Mind is 
resurrected. It is, however, given the name 'percepts', 
and its concept is also somewhat modified. It is no longer 
that mysterious simple entity necessarily known by virtue 
of being given in experience. Russell now defines it as 
"those matters of fact of which, independently of inference, 
we have a right to feel most nearly certain". They may even 
be true or false. Incidentally, it may be recalled that 
Russell in hifl Problems of Philoaophy and Kxtornal World 
has emphasised upon the point that sense-data are neither 
true nor false. It is the beliefs or propositions about 
them which are either true or false. 
Now he talks as if to consider them to be proved to 
be true or false. He says in his An Inquiary into Meaning 
and Truth, "The essential characteristic of a dataum is 
that it is not inferred. It may not be true and we may 
g 
not feel certain that it is true". An example is that of 
7. Bertrand Russell, Human knowledge - Its Scope and Limits. 
London t George Allen and Unwin Ltd, (!l948>, p. 186. 
8. Bert»and Russell, An Inquiary into Meaning and Truth 
(1966 - Seventh Impression), London : George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd, p. 124. 
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of memory* We know that sometimes our memory betrays us. But 
still we believe in many things on the basis of memory alone, 
Russell also has given the example of faint perceptions. 
Suppose* we are listening to a sound which is growing more 
distant, e.g.* of a receding aeroplane. At one time we are 
sure that we hear the sound but at another time we are sure 
that we do not hear. During Intermediary periods we still 
hear it, but cannot be sure about it. Thus there is a whole 
variety of sounds ranging from more certain to less certain 
and altogether uncertain. For Russell, all of these would 
be our data or x>ercepts. 
As to the nature of percepts, the problem is that 
whether only the bare sensation should be treated as a 
particular percept or the element of interpretation or 
inference which usually spontaneously accompanies it should 
also be included in it. In almost every case of perception, 
some element of interpretation or inference is inevitably 
present. This is evident from the fact that the effects of 
a given sensory stimulus upon two men with indistinguishable 
sense-organs but with different history of experiences are 
different. A child who is still in the stage of learning 
the words identifies each individual letter and only after 
that he is able to read the word. But a man who is habitual 
of reading goes quite unconsciously over the letters. 
M 
The problem is that the mnemlc associations upon which 
the'interpretation' depends» although frequent and usual» 
are, however, by no means Invariable* This would mean that 
If we allow the Interpretation to be Included In datum, there 
would be certain perceptions which would be erroneous. For 
example. In the case of seeing a mirage the seeing of water 
Is Interpreted when we associate with It also the tactual 
sensation which Is characteristic of water. Clearly, the 
occurrence In as much as It Is seen Is quite genuine. But 
It becomes erroneous when we add to It Its usual mnemlc 
elements. Thus, Inclusion of the Interpreted element in 
data indiscriminately would amount to providing room for 
some perceptions being erroneous. 
But on the other hand the bare sensation is not 
usually directly experienced. In most of our experiences 
It is accompanied with its mnemlc associates which can be 
separated from it only by an elaborate theory. And in the 
process, it may be feared that the bare sense-datum remains 
no longer a datum but become a hypothetical entity in being 
Inferred from what is actually experienced, i.e. , interpreted 
dataum. 
This last argument seems to Russell to be conclusive*, 
Perception, he says, must include those elements which 
are irreducibly physiological. But it need not on that 
accoxint Include those elements which come, or can be made 
to come within the sphere of conscious inference. For example, 
the inference of a substantial entity 'dog* from his barking 
is conscious, or at any rate, is easily capable of being 
made conscious. Thus, in this case, the bare noise of barking 
should be treated as datum instead of its accompanying some-
thing else along with it. 
Finally Russell refutes instrumentalists who claim 
that the very notion of pure datum is impossible as all 
our knowledge involves inevitably and invariably some element 
of inference. When we say 'look, there is an eclipse of the 
moon*, a lot of our knowledge about astronomy is presupposed 
in understanding this 8t-3tement, But Russell says that this 
view underestimates the power of analysis. There is no denying 
that our everyday interpretations of perceptive experiences 
and even all our everyday words embody theories. But, he 
contends, "it is not impossible to whittle away the element 
of interpretation, or to invent an artificial language 
involving a minimum theory. By these methods we can approach 
9 
asymptomatically to the pure datum". 
That there must be a pure datum, is, for Russell, 
a logically irrefutable consequence of the fact that 
9. Ibid, p. 124. 
perceptions give rise to new knowledge. Suppose* for Instance, 
that we have hitherto a certain group of theories but we 
now find that somewhere among these theories there Is a 
mistake. This means that there Is something which is inexpli-
cable in its terms, i.e., not deduclble from the previous 
theory. And this something would be a new datum for our 
knowledge of matters of fact since 'datum* means simply 
"a piece of knowledge that is not deduced", 
Russell's renewed faith in the 'data' and 'relation' 
(between subject and object) amounted to a retreat not only 
to his phenomenalistic position of External World but, in 
very important respects, to his original dualistic position 
of the Problems of Philosophy. In the Analysis of Matter he 
revives three^term theory of knowledge (this theory was first 
advocated in his Problems of Philosophy). According to this 
theory (Russell also calls this theory 'Causal theory'), 
subject confronts percepts which reveal the structure of 
physical things which causes them from outside. The basic 
difference bettraen the two positions is that while the 
former subject was a mind, a subsisting entity, and object 
a material substance, in the latter both are made up of 
the same stuff. Russell still retains the metaphysical 
position of neutrality of stuff. But subject and object are 
qualitatively the same realities. They are what Russell 
10, Op. clt. p. 124. 
w 
calls 'events* Which may roughly be understood by the term 
'energy-units* to which Russell arrived through theory of 
relativity. 
According to Russell» at every moment of our cosmos, 
there are occurring an infinite number of events some of 
^om, at a particular moment, fall within the experiential 
field of a brain which is itself a composition of events. 
The occurrence of an event in the experiential field of a 
brain causes to start a process of events which ends up in 
the nervous system of the body (itself a collection of events). 
Prom the point upon perceiver's body where this process 
terminates, another process of events starts which passing 
through the nerves reaches at brain and produces an event 
into it. It is this last event in the brain which is to be 
addressed as the 'experiencing of the object* belonging to 
the *rorld external to the perceipent's body. It is 'percept* 
that is related to the original event through causal laws 
which are studied in physics. 
The entire process which constitutes knowing — the 
external event which is causing the process, the brain and 
the percept — all are termed by Russell as 'events*. So 
what the subject )cnows is percept. This means that the loiow" 
ledge of external events is inferred and therefore open 
to doubt. Thus the gulf between the world of sense and world 
of physics, of which Russell spoke in his earlier works, 
reappears. Russell* therefore, makes a fresh attempt to 
bridge this gulf by evolving arguments which can make the 
existance of external physical things highly probable, if 
not indubitably certain. Since his new attempt falls mainly 
within the ambit of epistemology we shall not discuss it 
here. Instead let us take up the essentially ontological 
question : What is the nature of 'percepts' and what are 
their physical status and also that where can they be placed 
in the general scheme of physical causal laws ? 
We have seen Russell adopted dualistlc theory of 
perception. It is, however, different from Locke's or 
critical realist's dualism, Russell's view differs from 
the former in that he does not believe in the mind or body 
as substances which make contact with each other through 
certain 'ideas', Russell's view of the world is such that 
there are in it an infinite number of physical entities 
which he calls 'events'. These events are arranged into 
11, Locke held that perception consists in the mind's taking 
cognizance of physical objects through certain qualities 
which depend upon the former but are product of the 
latter. Physical things comprise primary qualities and 
these produce secondary qualities after coming in contact 
with the mind. There were thus, in the whole process, 
three terms, viz,, the mind, the physical things and 
secondary qualities. Critical realists uphold the same 
three terms with certain modifications. 
I 
groups. A group consists of structurally similar or semi-
similar events \«hich are arranged in a symmetrical order 
having a centre. When this centre happens to fall within the 
purview of a brain (or a camera, or a dictaphone) the occu-
rrence called *perception* takes place. 
Suppose, for example» in a dark night a monetary 
flash is experienced by a person. Here infact what happens 
is that a process of light waves stemmed from a 'centre* 
and reached the perceiver*s eye which is the collection of 
ontologically similar centres. After reaching the eyes the 
process enters into a different sort of region which is 
physiological« comprising the optic nerves and a part of 
brain. In this physiological region, the process observes 
and obeys different sort of laws and the event which comes 
in the end of this process further modifies its character 
having been already modified when the process reached the 
eyes. 
There are thus three fundamental terms in this process. 
First is the event which occured in the space outside the 
percepient's body and from which the process started. The 
second is the event which occured when the process reached 
percepient*s eyes which may be called stimulus-event. The 
third event which is * percept* is the last event >*iich occurs 
in the brain when the physiological constitution of perceiver 
is stimulated. Thus, to the psychological event called 
10' 
•percept' correspond two other sorts of events, namely, 
cerebral or physiological and the physical events. 
The uniqueness of Russell's view is that he believes 
percepts to be insidfe the brain, to be parts of brain. This 
vias a radical view quite unprecedented in the ^ole history 
of philosophy* Philosophers who hold a causal theory of 
perceptions are almost unanimous upon the point that things 
are in the time and space while the thoughts outside them. 
But Russell rejects this view saying that it is based upon 
two false assumptions : one is that of thinking the percepts 
to be located in the physical objects and the other is 
treating brain as a substantial physical thing, Russell's 
position, on the other hand, is that the physical object 
and brain both are events arranged into groups. When an 
event becomes part of the group forming the brain it comes 
to be called a percept. 
In his Analysis of Matter Russell clearly stated that 
a percept considered physically, is not very different from 
12 
other physical events* His aim in showing the physical 
character of percepts was to prove the fundamental contention 
of his philosophy of this stage that our making a qualitative 
distinction between the physical things and psychological 
thoughts is both logically and scientifically untenable. 
12. Op. Cit. • p. 263, 
1 0 ; 
They are different only In following two different kinds 
of laws being placed in two different regions of the same 
reality. Percepts, i.e., the thoughts are parts of our 
•event-ful' world and are themselves events like the 
physical and cerebral events. Reality thus, according to 
Russell, is neither physical nor mental, it is neutral. 
The riddle that whether Russell remained a neutral monist 
or not in the last stage of his philosophical career thus 
gets resolved. 
The discussion will be complete if the new technical 
term introduced in this chapter - percepts — is discussed 
somewhat elaborately* Many commentators have discussed 
this concept with some variations. But we shall discuss 
only Russell's own view stated in the Analysis of Matter. 
Perhaps percepts are the same thing what has been 
earlier termed sense-data, Russell writes j "When a 
n umber of people are, from the standpoint of comnonsense, 
observing the same object, there are both likenesses and 
13 differences among their percepts". His problem was 
that of deciding what elements in a percept can be used 
for inference as to the existence of something other than 
< itself and as to the nature of the inferences when they 
13. op, Cit,, p. 218. 
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can be drawn* We have already discussed this process In 
the preceding paragraphs. So i*e shall confine our dis-
cussion to physical status and structure of percepts. 
Physical status of percepts means status of "patches 
of colour, noises, smells, hardness, etc., as \<ell as 
perceived spatial relations/ Russell holds, as has been 
seen earlier, the world Is full of events, often a group 
of these events, or some characteristic which the members 
of the group possess In varying degrees. Is such as to 
suggest arrangement In an order. For example, the percepts 
of different people when they look at a penny may be ordered 
by their size and by their shape. The orders derived from 
different sources are roughly Identical, says Russell, 
e.g. • If we motre so as to make the big drum look larger, 
we also move so as to make It sound louder. "In this way 
we construct a space containing both percipients and 
physical objects; but percepts have a twofold location In 
this space, namely that of the percipient and that of the 
physical object. Keeping one half of this location fixed, 
we obtain the view of the world from a given place; keeping 
the other half fixed, we obtain the views of a given 
physical object from different places. The first of these 
Is a percipient, the second i£ a physical object,* 
For Russell» the gulf between percepts and physics 
is not a gulf as regards intrinsic quality. Because he says 
10 
we do not know anything of the intrinsic quality of the 
{^yslcal world and, therefore, do not know whether It Is, 
or Is not very different from that of percepts. The gulf 
Is aa to what we know about the two realms. We know the 
quality of percepts, but we do not know their laws so well 
as we could wish. Says Russell : "we know the laws of 
physical world, in so far as these are mathematical, 
preety well, but we know nothing else about it. If there 
is any intellectual difficulty in supposing that the physical 
world is intrinsically quite unlike that of percepts, this 
is a reason for supposing that there is not this complete 
unlikeness. And there is a certain ground for such a view, 
in the fact that percepts are part of the physical world, 
and are the only part that we can know without the help of 
14 
rather elaborate and difficult inferences". 
As to the structure of percepts, Russell says that 
a percept may hav > parts which are not percepts. Moreover 
he says that the structure of a percept may be only dls-' 
coverable by inference. He also says that the percept 
contains parts that are not process and these parts are 
imperceptible. 
Russell's main problem was eplstemologlcal. In 
course of his eplstemologlcal discussion he developed 
14. Ibid, p. 264, 
several o„tolo..caX theories which have ^e„ aiscussea .„ 
this thesis. The <^estlon naturally arises : old Russell 
succeed 1„ his Endeavour 7 Many writers have tried to 
•valuate his work 1„ „»any ways. But after a close scrutiny 
it appears that for Judging a philosophical endeavour 
general scientific yardstick should not be used. Perhaps 
the better yardstick would be seriousness and sincerety 
o£ the thinker to solve the issue at hand, if the validity 
of this criterion is admitted, we can without an iota of 
hesitation say that Russell Indeed was successful in 
solving the problem confronted by him. In the history 
of philosophy there rarely appeared any philosopher who 
was so self-critical and outspoken. Whenever he could 
detect any flaw in his previous view he did not dither 
to point out that one and rectify ininedlately. He kept 
h Imself abreast of most recent developments of physics 
and psychology and tried to develop his theory striking 
a balance between science, commonsense and Intellectual 
thinking. He was a philosopher who frankly wrote : "My 
intellectual journeys have been, in some respects, dis-
appointing". 
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